Providing access control and identity verification for communications when receiving a communication at an entity to be verified

ABSTRACT

The techniques herein are directed generally to providing access control and identity verification for communications when receiving a communication at an entity to be verified. In one embodiment, a receiving device receives a communication from an initiating device on a communication channel, wherein the initiating device is configured to determine whether an identity associated with the receiving device is verified by a verification service. The receiving device verifies the identity through a verification service client application on the receiving device, and conveys, to the verification service over a verification channel, that the identity associated with the receiving device is verified, wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to the initiating device over the verification channel, that the identity is verified. The communication then continues with the initiating device on the communication channel, wherein the initiating device manages the communication according to the identity being verified.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to, and is a continuation-in-part of,U.S. patent application Ser. No. 16/703,846, filed on Dec. 4, 2019,entitled STORING INFORMATION WITHIN A ZERO-KNOWLEDGE DATA MANAGEMENTNETWORK, by Shockley, et al., the contents of which being incorporatedherein by reference in its entirety. Also, U.S. patent application Ser.No. 16/703,846 itself claims priority to U.S. Provisional PatentApplication No. 62/775,302, filed on Dec. 4, 2018, entitledZERO-KNOWLEDGE DATA MANAGEMENT NETWORK, by Shockley, et al., as well asto U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/852,850, filed on May 24,2019, entitled PROVIDING ACCESS CONTROL AND IDENTITY VERIFICATION FOR ACONTACT CENTER, by Shaffer, et al., the contents of each of which beingincorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure relates generally to communication systems, and,more particularly, to providing access control and identity verificationfor communications.

BACKGROUND

A contact center is an entity (centralized or distributed, despite theterm “center”) used for receiving or transmitting a large volume ofenquiries by telephone, video, online audio, text (or “txt”), or otherreal-time contact methodology or live support software. Contact centersmay either be outbound, inbound, or both, where outbound contact centersare typically operated for outgoing contact (e.g., telemarketing,solicitations, debt collection, market research, fraud alerts, and soon), and inbound contact centers are typically operated for incomingrequests for services (e.g., product or service support, informationenquiries from consumers, instructions to perform services such asfinancial transactions, etc.). Banks, for example, may have both inboundand outbound operations, both accepting incoming user requests (e.g.,balance information or transfers), and conversely for reaching out tocustomers with outgoing offerings or requests (e.g., fraud alertconfirmation, etc.).

Contact center agents may either work in centralized call center or/andin a distributed facilities such as at remote (e.g., home) locationswith workstations that include a computer and display for each agent anda telephone set/headset connected to a telecom switch or to aninbound/outbound call management system, where the voice, txt, and datapathways into the center are linked through a set of new technologiescalled “computer telephony integration”, or multimedia contact centers.These centers can be operated by either an in-house department (of thecompany) or a third-party agency (outside of the company) known as a“contact center outsourcer”.

Through these contact centers, valuable information can be exchangedbetween a company and its customers (or other employees of the samecompany), and customer interactions can be managed generally. One majorproblem faced today, however, is verification of the user at the otherend of the communication. This problem occurs in both directions;namely, a company wants to confirm that they are communicating with theintended customer, and a customer wants to confirm that they arecommunicating with the intended company. Additionally, customers alsowant to know that their information is secure, whether from hackersbreaking into contact center databases, or from unscrupulous contactcenter agents who may simply be keeping notes on personal authenticationinformation, including usernames, passwords, security question answers,and so on.

Moreover, as more and more users operate on mobile devices, theincreasing sophistication of the users results not only in demands forfrictionless user experiences with stringent security to preventimproper use or abuse of their data, but also in a decrease in tolerancefor those operations that do not offer such experiences. Multi-factorauthentication (MFA), though growing in popularity, is an authenticationmethod in which a device or user is granted access to an applicationonly after successfully presenting two or more pieces of evidence (orfactors) to an authentication mechanism: knowledge (something the userand only the user knows), possession (something the user and only theuser has), and inherence (something the user and only the user is).However, MFA can often be a frustrating experience, or can be underminedwith weak authentication correlation (e.g., sending a text message to astolen phone to “confirm” that the user is who he or she says they are).

Furthermore, caller ID is simple to fake. Using various knowntechniques, a hacker can call a bank pretending to be a valid user andcan attempt to transfer funds to another account, or alternatively, ahacker can call a client of a bank pretending to be their bank, and canattempt to obtain and compromise personal information from theunsuspecting called party.

SUMMARY

The techniques herein are directed generally to providing access controland user verification (i.e., both called party and calling partyverification) for communications, such as for a contact center. Inparticular, according to one or more embodiments described herein, amethod is shown for automatically sorting incoming contacts into“verified” and “non-verified” contacts, as well as for detectingspoofing caller ID “attack” and identifying an “attack level” or a“required security level”. In further embodiments, methods are shown foradapting the required authentication level based on the level of risk asdetermined by an attack level. Still further, methods are shown fortailoring user-interface pop-ups based on the specific information theuser wants to share and the manner in which they desire to interfacewith the platform.

Specifically, the current application is directed to providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications when receiving acommunication at an entity to be verified. In one particular embodiment,an illustrative method according to one or more embodiments of thepresent disclosure may comprise: receiving, at a receiving device, acommunication from an initiating device on a communication channel,wherein the initiating device is configured to determine whether anidentity associated with the receiving device is verified by averification service; verifying, by the device, the identity associatedwith the receiving device through a verification service clientapplication on the device; conveying, from the receiving device to theverification service over a verification channel, and in response to theidentity associated with the receiving device being verified by theverification service client application, that the identity associatedwith the receiving device is verified, wherein the verification serviceis caused to convey, to the initiating device over the verificationchannel, that the identity associated with the receiving device isverified; and continuing, by the receiving device with the initiatingdevice, the communication on the communication channel, wherein theinitiating device is caused, in response to the identity associated withthe receiving device being verified, to manage the communication to thedevice according to the identity being verified.

Other embodiments of the present disclosure may be discussed in thedetailed description below, and the summary above is not meant to belimiting to the scope of the invention herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The embodiments herein may be better understood by referring to thefollowing description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings inwhich like reference numerals indicate identically or functionallysimilar elements, of which:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example simplified computer network;

FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a computing device;

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of verified communication between twoendpoints according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a “zero-knowledge enablement network”framework according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 5 illustrates an example basic architecture and example flow foruser onboarding according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 6 illustrates an example of verifying a user connecting to acontact center, whether inbound or outbound, according to one or moreembodiments herein;

FIG. 7 illustrates an example architecture for user verification,particularly an inbound scenario where an access and verificationservices (AVS) user (a user with an AVS app) calls from the AVS appitself according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 8 illustrates an example flowchart detailing a procedure from thepoint of view of an access control gateway (ACG) in FIG. 7 aboveaccording to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 9 illustrates an example architecture for user verification, nowwhere an AVS user, with the AVS app, calls the contact center directlyfrom a mobile phone according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 10 illustrates an example flowchart detailing a procedure for FIG.9 above according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 11 illustrates an example architectural flow for a non-verifieduser according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 12 illustrates an example flowchart detailing a procedure for FIG.11 above according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 13 illustrates an example architecture view of the contact centermaking an outbound call to a user's phone number (or other contactingidentification, such as for VoIP, video calls, etc.) according to one ormore embodiments herein;

FIG. 14 illustrates an example flowchart detailing the outboundprocedure described above in FIG. 13 according to one or moreembodiments herein;

FIGS. 15A-15I illustrate an example walkthrough discussion of providingaccess control and user verification for a contact center according toone or more embodiments herein;

FIGS. 16A-16D illustrate an example for pushing an outbound request forcommunication (i.e., the contact center pushes a notification to theuser) according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIGS. 17A-17B illustrate an example where the user ignores an initialnotification according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIGS. 18A-18D illustrate an example of an outbound call being requestedfrom the user according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 19 illustrates an example for when a user calls the enterprise'sphone number directly according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIGS. 20A-20B illustrate an example where a user has opened their AVSapp, but has not yet logged in (i.e., an inbound call pre-login)according to one or more embodiments herein;

FIGS. 21A-21B illustrate an example where the user has opened their appand has logged in (i.e., an inbound call post login) according to one ormore embodiments herein;

FIG. 22 illustrates an example “zero knowledge” request and verificationaccording to one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 23 illustrates an example of verification token passing accordingto one or more embodiments herein;

FIG. 24 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when receiving acommunication from an entity to be verified;

FIG. 25 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when initiating acommunication from an entity to be verified;

FIG. 26 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when initiating acommunication to an entity to be verified;

FIG. 27 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when receiving acommunication at an entity to be verified; and

FIG. 28 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications between aninitiating device and a recipient device in accordance with one or moreembodiments described herein.

DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

A computer network is a distributed collection of nodes (e.g.,transmitters, receivers, transceivers, etc.) interconnected bycommunication links and segments for transporting signals or databetween the nodes, such as personal computers, workstations, mobiledevices, servers, routers, or other devices. Many types of computernetworks are available, including, but not limited to, local areanetworks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), cellular networks, broadbandnetworks, infrastructure or backhaul networks, public switched telephonenetworks (PSTNs), and many others.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example, and simplified, computer network 100. Asshown, computer network 100 may contain various devices communicatingover links 110 and an internetwork 115, such as end devices 120, servers130, databases 140 (which may be part of servers 130 or in communicationwith and under the control of servers 130), and other devices as will beappreciated by those skilled in the art. Data transmissions 150 (e.g.,packets, frames, messages, transmission signals, etc.) may be exchangedamong the nodes/devices of the computer network 100 using predefinedcommunication protocols where appropriate over links 110. In thiscontext, a protocol consists of a set of rules defining how the nodesinteract and exchange information with each other.

Notably, the computer network 100 may comprise various individualnetworks intercommunicating with each other, such as LANs, WANs,cellular/LTE networks, PSTN, and so on, and may include any number ofwired or wireless links between the devices, accordingly. Note also thatwhile links 110 are shown generically interconnecting with theinternetwork 115, any number of intermediate devices (e.g., routers,switches, firewalls, etc.) may actually make up the composition of thenetwork 100 and internetwork 115, and the view shown herein is merely asimplified illustration.

End devices 120 may comprise different types of devices, such as, e.g.,personal computers, desktop computers, laptop computers, mobile devices,tablets, smartphones, wearable electronic devices (e.g., smart watches),smart televisions, set-top devices for televisions, workstations, smartvehicles, terminals, kiosks, automated teller machines (ATMs),applications running on such devices, and so on, often interfacing withhuman users, though not necessarily. For instance, end devices 120 mayalso comprise drones, automated vehicles, artificial intelligence“beings” or robots, internet of things (IoT) devices, and so on.

Servers 130 and/or databases 140 may comprise singular servers and/ordatabases, server and/or database farms, cloud-based server and/ordatabase services, network attached storage (SAN), and any other type orconfiguration of computing devices that provides computing and/orstorage services as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.Servers 130 and/or databases 140 may be centralized (i.e., processingand/or storage occurring on a single device or within a single locationof devices) or distributed/decentralized (i.e., processing and/orstorage occurring across multiple devices or across a plurality oflocations). Notably, for example, servers 130 and/or databases 140 maybe deployed on the premises of an enterprise or may be cloud-based.

FIG. 2 is a simplified schematic block diagram of an example computingdevice 200 that may be used with one or more embodiments describedherein (e.g., end device 120, sever 130, database 140, etc.).Illustratively, device 200 may generally include one or morecommunication interfaces 210, one or more processors 220, and a memory240 interconnected by a system bus 250 or other dedicated circuitry, andis powered by a power supply system 260. Additionally, the device 200,where required, may comprise one or more user interfaces 230 configuredto solicit and receive user input (input/output or “I/O” components,such as displays, keyboards, touchscreens, biometrics, and so on).

The communication interfaces 210 include the mechanical, electrical, andsignaling circuitry for communicating data over wired and/or wirelesslinks of a communication network.

The memory 240 includes a plurality of storage locations that areaddressable by the processor(s) 220 for storing software programs anddata structures associated with the embodiments described herein. Theprocessor(s) 220 may comprise necessary elements or logic adapted toexecute the software programs and manipulate the data structures 245. Anoperating system 242, portions of which are typically resident in memory240 and executed by the processor(s) 220, functionally organizes thedevice by, among other things, invoking operations in support ofsoftware processors and/or services executing on the device.Illustratively, these software processes and/or services may include oneor more functional processes 246 (e.g., specific to functionality of thedevice), and an example “access and verification” process 248 that isconfigured to perform the operations described herein.

It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that other processor andmemory types, including various computer-readable media, may be used tostore and execute program instructions pertaining to the techniquesdescribed herein. Also, while the description illustrates variousprocesses, it is expressly contemplated that various processes may beembodied as modules configured to operate in accordance with thetechniques herein (e.g., according to the functionality of a similarprocess). Further, while processes may be shown and/or describedseparately, those skilled in the art will appreciate that processes maybe routines or modules within other processes.

——Access Control and Identity Verification——

As noted above, one major problem faced today is verification of usersat the other end of a communication, in both directions. That is, acompany often wants to confirm that they are communicating with anintended customer, while a customer often wants to confirm that they arecommunicating with the intended company. The same could be true for anytwo users or end-points at either end of a communication.

For example, imagine that a bank initiates an outbound call to a user inorder to verify suspicious activity on the user's account. When theperson answers the phone, the bank may wish to verify that the personanswering is actually the user/owner of the account. Since simply askingthe question if they are the owner of the account is clearlyinsufficient to verify identity, the bank can either ask securityquestions or may send a multi-factor authentication (MFA) request forthe user's account. In the former case, people close to the accountowner, such as family or friends who may have answered the phone, mayknow many of the answers, such as first car, mother's maiden name,street the user grew up on, etc. Also, if the MFA verification uses thephone, such as a text message, email, etc., then all MFA accomplishes isconfirming that the answerer has the user's phone, and not necessarilythat they are, in fact, the user.

As another example, assume that the user is actually answering the callfrom the bank. How, now, can the user confirm that it is actually thebank (or government, or doctor, or school, and so on) that is calling?Today, most users rely on the company first providing some informationthat at least indicates that they know something about the user, butmany users still fall victim to phishing attempts where the caller hassomehow obtained portions of identifying information (e.g., user's name,phone number, address, last four digits of a social security number,etc.), or the users may simply answer verification questions (passwords,pins, security questions, account numbers, etc.) without evenquestioning whether they are answering the actual company or someoneelse looking for fooled users to supply the information.

For example, one potential attack on obtaining source data from one oreven a plethora of source devices is a phishing or spear-phishingattempt. Generally, phishing is the fraudulent practice of purporting tobe from a reputable company in order to induce individuals to revealpersonal information, such as passwords and credit card numbers, whilespear-phishing is the research-based practice of pretending to be aknown or trusted sender in order to induce specifically targetedindividuals to reveal confidential information or transfer funds.Through such a practice, it is possible that a source device (or theuser at the source device) could be fooled into authorizing the sharingof sensitive source data with an otherwise unauthorized recipientdevice.

Through the increased proliferation of digital identities, not only aremore than 1-in-10 new account creations fraudulent, but the other9-in-10 are subject to 100% growth year-over-year in attacks to accesssensitive information in a user's account, whether through accounttakeover or through breaking into and accessing a less-than-securedatabase.

Information privacy and security are thus particularly important toconsumers and computer technology. With the proliferation of hackingincidents against user information, attack vulnerability has beenaddressed in many ways to prevent or at least detect unsanctioned accessto data and user information. Still, to this day, such efforts have beenunable to keep up with the dedication of ill-willed individuals toovercome the many layers of security, the authorized access management,and the overall ever-changing data security landscape set forth by theadministrators tasked with protecting the stored and communicated data.As mentioned further above, customers want to know that theirinformation is secure, whether from hackers breaking into contact centerdatabases, or from unscrupulous contact center agents, whether at alegitimate contact center or pretending to be part of a legitimatecompany, who may be stealing personal authentication information,including usernames, passwords, security question answers, and so on.

Further breakdowns of trust and verification can be problematic as wellfor communications generally, such as where a person may pretend to becalling from a bank or other enterprise when calling a user. Forexample, by convincing the called party that the caller is the bank, thecalled party may be tricked into disclosing private information to anunverified caller who is merely claiming to be (and is not) the actualbank/enterprise. Even more so, there is sadly a risk that anunscrupulous contact center agent may use (or sell to another immoralperson on a black market, e.g., the “dark net”) the personal informationof a client, such as by merely copying or remember the privateinformation (e.g., passwords, pins, mother's maiden name, etc.). Thesecrooks could then use the stolen information in a fraudulent call to thebank/enterprise and convincingly pretend to be the lawful entity.

Accordingly, to address the needs of today's sophisticated users andcompanies, and to prevent infiltration by today's sophisticated hackers,the techniques herein are directed to frictionless user experience andstringent security to prevent improper use or abuse of privateinformation, and also provide intelligent end-user verification withoutsacrificing the security of the private information. That is, thetechniques herein provide access control, assurance that a user iscalled by a valid enterprise rather by a hacker spoofing the ID of theenterprise, as well as user verification for communications, such as forcontact centers. In general, the techniques herein address theverification of the identity of any entity at either end of acommunication (i.e., an identity associated with either the initiatingdevice or a receiving device), where the entity may be a person (i.e.,user of a device), the device itself, or an enterprise (e.g., a company,bank, government facility, etc.) and any of its authorized agents.

With reference to FIG. 3, verified communication 300 begins withcommunications 310 (voice calls, text, video calls, etc.) between twoendpoints (over a “communication channel”), illustratively mobiledevices 315 and an enterprise, e.g., a contact center 320 (e.g., throughan automatic or automated call distributor, “ACD” 325). Through servicesoffered by the techniques herein, referred to generally as “access andverification services” (AVS) (as well as the corresponding AVSapplication/clients/servers that are configured to participate in suchservices, as described herein, such as AVS server 335 as shown in FIG.3), a digital identity verification service may utilize “out of band”data network signaling 330 (over a “verification channel”) to ensure thecommunicating parties (caller and receiver) are who they say they are.Note that as used herein, the “out of band” verification channel impliesthat the verification occurs outside of the communication channel. Inother words, where the “communication channel” is whichever transmissionmedium is providing the communication between the two end devices (e.g.,over PSTN, the Internet, etc.), the “verification channel” is a separatedata communication channel (e.g., still possibly over the Internet orother secure transmission network) that provides the verification ofidentities as described herein (e.g., communications between the enddevices and the corresponding AVS application/clients/servers that areconfigured to facilitate identity verification). Note that in certainexample embodiments, the verification channel and communication channelmay traverse through the same paths (e.g., both over the internet, butstill separate in that the verification does not occur vocally over thevoice call or other communication medium, such that the verifier neednot hear/see any authentication factors of the entity to be verified).

The strong authentication process offered by the verified digitalidentity techniques herein:

-   -   is frictionless (e.g., knowledge-based authentication (KBA) is        eliminated);    -   has proof of mobile device ownership;    -   has proof of ownership of credential:        -   (e.g., biometric multi-factor, such as fingerprint,            4-Finger, palm, eye, face, etc.);        -   (e.g., behavioral and continuous verification (e.g.,            location, motion, app usage, etc.);    -   has authentications that include and in some example embodiments        enforce a “risk factor rating”;    -   verifies the identity of both an end-user and the calling        institute (e.g., a bank);    -   does not require participation by contact center agents in the        authentication process, and as such they a) do not see or hear        any credentials of the caller (e.g., only knowing that the        caller has been verified and authenticated by the application),        and b) do not spend time being involved in authentication, thus        enhancing the overall productivity of the contact center; and    -   does not require a contact center agent to disclose any        information to a called party (an outbound call), but rather the        called party may only receive a verification notification that        the caller (e.g., the bank/enterprise) is who the calling party        claims to be.

Additionally, according to the techniques described herein, for eachsecure contact center call setup, the system:

-   -   provides company-verified or AVS-verified identity;    -   eliminates dependence on Caller ID and voice analysis;    -   eliminates interactive voice response (IVR) pin reset attacks;    -   eliminates call setup impersonation;    -   eliminates insider attacks—(personally identifying information        (PII) data minimized);    -   reduces customer friction with highly personalized call        treatment and without requiring re-verification; and    -   increases efficiency of a call center by automating the process        of end user verification and eliminating the need of contact        center agents to participate in the authentication process.

With regard to PII, identity information, such as the Know Your Customer(KYC) data, is also critical for systems that operate, in at least somecapacity, based on the provable identity of a user. In particular,source devices can be spoofed (i.e., the source device identifies itselfas legitimate, when it is in fact only pretending to be the identifiedsource device), or users themselves can provide false identification(e.g., for money laundering, spear-phishing, or other criminal orgenerally malicious intent). For example, while online gaming is onearea where proving a gamer's real-life identity is likely not criticalto the operation of the game, banking, on the other hand, isgovernmentally regulated to require customer identification to beassociated with bank accounts. That is, though banks themselves may notneed to know more than an account number in order to perform atransaction, name matching against lists of known parties (such as a“politically exposed person” or PEP), determination of the customer'srisk in terms of propensity to commit money laundering, terroristfinance, or identity theft, and a plethora of other reasons have createdthe requirement by many governments that financial institutions need toverify the identity of individuals wishing to conduct financialtransactions with them (e.g., Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-money launderingcompliance programs). Specifically, strict background checks may benecessary and information must be shared from many different financialinstitutions in order to help combat money laundering due to oftencomplex ownership and company structures. In addition to banks, too,customers of various businesses, such as retail merchants, are oftenrequired to present an identification to complete a transaction or tosign up for a service. For instance, a merchant may require customeridentification for various types of purchases (e.g., alcohol, lottery,or tobacco purchases) or when certain types of payments (e.g., checks,credit cards) are presented to pay for transactions. Other reasons foridentity verification include “sockpuppetry”, underage signups,spamming, and illegal activities like harassment, scams, and moneylaundering through social media sites.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a “zero-knowledge enablement network”framework 400 that may be used for the Identity Network Services systemdescribed herein (e.g., AVS). Notably, the left “leg” 410 of theframework is technology that eliminates liability resulting from storingcustomer PII. Such a “zero-knowledge” data management network, forexample one as described in above-incorporated U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 16/703,846, filed on Dec. 4, 2019, entitled STORING INFORMATIONWITHIN A ZERO-KNOWLEDGE DATA MANAGEMENT NETWORK, by Shockley, et al.,allows users to share verifiable proof of data and/or a limitless listof details about themselves (identify information), and businesses areable to request, consume, and act on the data, providing ahyper-personalized experience—all without a data storage server or thosebusinesses ever seeing or having access to the raw sensitiveinformation. That is, the embodiments herein may utilize a decentralizednetwork for trust, identity, privacy, and personalization that reinventssecure data storage and digital identities, where server-stored data isviewable only by intended recipients (which may even be selected afterstorage of the data). Perhaps more importantly, the techniques hereinallow for devices without access to the data to trust the contents ofthe data (e.g., without even being able to decrypt and access/read thedata), guaranteeing that a user's identity is what he/she claims it tobe. That is, the zero-knowledge data management system herein canstrategically employ the use of an attestation service (e.g., anidentity verification service) or other identity verification service(e.g., biometrics such as facial recognition, iris recognition,fingerprinting, voice recognition, etc.), with controlled and limitedaccess to the data (i.e., if desired, no access to the data itself, butinstead only access to the fact that the data (to which one does nothave access) is verified to be correct).

The “right leg” 420 of the framework in FIG. 4 addresses verificationfor each user at either end of a communication, such as users connectingto an enterprise e.g., via a contact center or other user-basedapplication. For instance, using an attestation service or otheridentify verification service through a common architecture (or througha secure interface), the techniques herein may establish a frictionlessuser experience for users that is above and beyond typical multi-factorauthentication, in terms of security (ensuring identity), privacy(protecting identity), and frictionless user experience (ease offunctionality).

According to the techniques herein, users are able to share verifiableproof of data, and a limitless list of details about themselves.Enterprises, on the other hand, are able to request, consume, and act onthe data, and can provide a personalized experience without compromisingprivacy or security. Also, enterprises are able to prove that they arethe enterprise they claim to be, without disclosing any confidentialinformation to the called (or calling) party. Notably, according to thetechniques herein, this is all accomplished without:

-   -   a data storage server having access to the raw sensitive        information;    -   those businesses ever seeing or having access to the raw        sensitive information;    -   sacrificing how the businesses interact, and transact with the        customers; and    -   sacrificing compliance with all business legal obligations.

The techniques herein thus enable enterprises to verify users of mobileand VoIP devices to their contact centers without storing sensitiveinformation on a central server or exposing sensitive information tocontact center agents. In this manner, the techniques herein:

-   -   reduce fraud and defend against account take over;    -   reduce average call handling time;    -   reduce authentication expense;    -   improve customer experience;    -   protect users from fraud resulting from identity theft such as        account take over;    -   protect users from agent and contact center access to sensitive        user information; and    -   assure that the calling party is what it claims to be (by caller        ID and/or timing), without the need for the calling or called        party to divulge sensitive information of the called user or the        caller (notably increasing the rate of successful call        completion for outbound calls, since one of the issues        enterprises, e.g., banks, face is that when they call clients,        the clients assume that it is a fraud and they do not answer,        resulting in a low rate of successful calls).

The techniques herein are specifically tailored to avoid sacrificing howcompanies market, interact, and transact with their customers, or howthey generate reports for third-parties (e.g., government regulatoryagencies). For instance, as described below, each user connecting theenterprise or the contact center may be categorized as “validated” or“not validated” (or “verified” versus “unverified”). For those that arenot validated, each company, based on their fraud tolerance thresholds,will have their own policy/practice for how to handle those unvalidatedusers. In other words, as described below, the techniques herein reducefraud by providing identity assurance, and reduce authentication expenseby automatically sorting calls from verified/non-verified connectingusers without burdening the validated connecting users. This cantranslate into a significant savings for the authentication process.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example basic architecture 500 and example flowfor user onboarding. For instance, the illustrative primary componentsof the architecture are the “AVS server” 510 (implementing or at leastcoordinating/facilitating the techniques herein), a mobile device 520operating an “AVS client” or application/app 525, and an enterprise 530(e.g., bank), which may be embodied as a local, remote, or distributedcontact center. Additionally, an attestation agency 540 may be used toattest to (verify) the identity of the user 505. In certain embodiments,a compliance service 550 (e.g., the government) may also be connected tothe AVS server and the enterprise in order to request and receivereports about the users, as will be understood by those skilled in theart. Note that for certain embodiments herein, the communicationsbetween the devices in FIG. 5 may be securely managed (transmitted andstored) in accordance with a zero-knowledge data management network asmentioned above. That is, the architecture 500 of FIG. 5 may be used inconjunction with the zero-knowledge data management technique describedin FIG. 4 above, serving as a foundation for a infrastructure of boththe zero-knowledge data management system and the access control andidentity verification system described herein.

According to one specific embodiment of user onboarding andauthentication, a third-party (e.g., the AVS server) can obtainattestation from an attestation service by: storing PII information on athird-party server, wherein the third-party server and an attestationservice cannot read the stored information; storing, on the third-partyserver, a re-encryption key that converts the stored information to aformat readable to only the attestation service; requesting, by thethird-party server from the attestation service, attestation of whetherthe stored information is correct, wherein requesting comprises applyingthe re-encryption key to the stored information and sending the storedinformation, in the format readable to only the attestation service, tothe attestation service; receiving, by the third-party server from theattestation service, an indication as to whether the stored information,which cannot be read by the third-party server, is attested as correctby the attestation service; and providing, from the third-party server,the indication as to whether the stored information is attested ascorrect by the attestation service to an interested device (e.g., theenterprise/bank), without the third-party server knowing theinformation.

Specifically, this type of “zero-knowledge attestation” according to oneor more specific embodiments herein, begins with attestationagency/server being configured as a verification service that comprisesone or both of automated attestation or manually assisted attestationtechniques, as generally understood by those skilled in the art. Forexample, a typical identity verification service, in particular, ensuresthat users or customers provide information that is associated with theidentity of a real person, such as by verifying the authenticity ofphysical identity documents such as a driver's license or passport(“documentary verification”), and/or by verify identity informationagainst authoritative sources such as a credit bureau or government data(“non-documentary verification”). Manually-assisted techniques, whichmay be performed also through artificial intelligence, may includeidentity verification through webcams (e.g., holding up a driver'slicense next to a user's face to confirm the visual comparison and thedata on the license). Identity “scoring” (e.g., likelihood that a useris who they say they are) may also be used and shared as a result, e.g.,rather than (or in addition to) a simple yes/no or verified/not result.To attest to data integrity, on the other hand, various methods oftrusted computing and remote attestation may be used, allowing a programat the source device to authenticate itself (e.g., the software/versionrunning at the source device) or the data (e.g., computed hashes,configuration data, revision tracking, and other data/meta-data-basedinformation). Completeness of the records/data may also be attested to,such as confirmations that all requested data fields have been filled inwith legitimate answers, even if the accuracy of the answers themselvesare not specifically attested to in certain configurations. Note thatmany different techniques may be used for identity and data integrityattestation, and that the specific techniques shown herein are merelyexamples for a better understanding of the role and responsibilities ofattestation server/agency.

With reference still to FIG. 5, a communication exchange between thedevices of the attestation service environment is based on anattestation request from the AVS server. Generally, any device withinthe system in FIG. 5 can initiate the attestation request, such as theAVS/storage server, the mobile device, or the enterprise/bank as averifying recipient device which may receive a signed certificate, aconfirmation message, etc., without ever seeing the actualinformation/PII used for attestation.

As an example, a user 505 may enter his/her identity information (e.g.,KYC information) as “source data” (PII data) 581 at the source device520 (e.g., through the AVS app/client 525, which may bedownloaded/obtained (582, as shown) from the enterprise 530 (e.g.,branded), or from the AVS Server 510 (e.g., general)). The source devicemay then open an account (e.g., a bank account) through request 583, andsince the source data is intended to be kept in secret, the sourcedevice or the controller device (enterprise 530) may inform the storageserver 510 that a new user is trying to open an account (report 584),and that an attestation to the identity of the user is needed (i.e., thesource/PII data), thus “report 584” is also an “attestation request584”. Notably, collection of the source data may be generalized (e.g.,the source device collects the data to share generally with otherdevices as requested), or else the collection may be specificallydirected by other devices, such as the attestation server, thecontroller device, or any other verifying recipient device. That is, thesource device may receive instructions from any of these devices tocollect the source data, either generally or in response specifically toan attestation request.

The attestation server 540 shares its public key (A PubK) 585, either tothe source device 520 directly or else to the storage server 510 who canthen share it with the source device. Alternatively, the attestationserver public key may be shared with the source device by any othermethod, including by being publicly known. Note that the source devicemay already have the attestation server's public key prior to theattestation request, or else may receive it in response to theattestation request (e.g., the storage server connects with theattestation server and obtains the attestation server's publicencryption key, to then share it with the source device).

At this point, in this specific embodiment, the storage server 510 mayeither already have the source-encrypted source data (PII encrypted bythe user's public key, U PubK) 586, or else the source device mayencrypt the source data and provide the storage server with thesource-encrypted source data 586. Here, the source device 520, inresponse to the attestation request (and in certain embodiments, thusreceiving the attestation public key) establishes anattestation-server-based rekeying key 587 through an encryptingcombination of the source decryption key (e.g., a private key, U PriK)of the source device and the attestation server public key (A PubK).Accordingly, by sending the attestation-server-based rekeying key 587 tothe storage server 510, and in response to the attestation request 584received at the storage server (i.e., a request to share the source/PIIdata with the attestation server), the AVS/storage server re-encrypts(e.g., is caused to re-encrypt) the source-encrypted source data 586with the attestation-server-based rekeying key 587, where there-encrypting results in the source/PII data being encrypted with theattestation server public key (attestation-server-based encrypted sourcedata 589). Note still that the AVS/storage server is unable to decryptthe source data encrypted with the attestation server public key (i.e.,attestation-server-based encrypted source data 589).

The AVS/storage server 510 may then send the attestation-server-basedencrypted source data 589 to the attestation server 540 in response tothe attestation request. Notably, the specific attestation request forsource data may be associated with a trackable identifier (ID) in orderto coordinate the attestation to the source data (e.g., a hash functionof the data). That is, the ID pairs the request (and also a signedcertificate, described below) with the source data (and thussource-encrypted source data).

Once the attestation server 540 receives the source data encrypted withthe attestation server public key (attestation-server-based encryptedsource data 589) from the storage server 510, then the attestationserver applies its own private key to obtain and process the user'sidentity information from the previously encrypted source data (i.e.,decrypting the attestation-server-based encrypted source data using anattestation server private key of the attestation server).

The attestation server may now view, verify, and attest to the decryptedsource data (e.g., to the personally identifying information (PII), orelse to the data integrity in other examples mentioned herein), usingvarious attestation techniques. For example, PII may be attested tobased solely on the source data (e.g., documentary verification) or elseon greater information (e.g., non-documentary verification). Forexample, a communication may be established between the source deviceand the attestation server, where the attestation server is configuredto attest to the PII based on the source data and user interaction viathe established communication (e.g., webcam verification, real-timequestion answering, etc.). Any suitable attestation technique may beused herein, and those mentioned above are merely example embodimentsfor illustration.

Assuming the data is verified by the attestation server 540 (e.g.,manually, autonomously, and/or autonomously with manual assistance),then the attestation server creates a signed certificate (KYC Y/NVerified) 590 signifying (acknowledging) the attestation to the sourcedata (or non-attestation). The attestation contents of the certificatemay be anything from a simple “verified” indication, an attestationscore, a report of what is being attested to (e.g., “this certifies thatuser ID #12345 has acceptably provided their identity on this date”),and so on. In particular, according to the techniques herein, theattestation server creates a signed certificate (based on attesting tothe source data) that would allow a verifying recipient device toconfirm that the source data has been attested to by the attestationserver based only on the signed certificate (i.e., withoutaccessing/decrypting the source-encrypted source data). In oneembodiment, the verification may be associated with a particularidentification number tying it to the original request (e.g., an “AVS #& Verified” message 591), either by the attestation server 590 orappended by the AVS server 510.

In one embodiment, similar to digital signature techniques, theattestation server 540 signs its verification message (signing thesigned certificate) 590 by encrypting the verification message(attestation contents) by its own private key (attestation serverprivate key). This message can then be decrypted by any verifyingrecipient device (e.g., the enterprise 530) with knowledge of public keyof the attestation server (which is known to everyone as it is public).Said differently, the verifying recipient device is caused to confirmthat the source data has been attested to by the attestation serverbased on applying the attestation server public key to the signedcertificate. Since the public key of the attestation server decrypts themessage, it is proof that only the attestation server (the only entitythat knows the attestation server's private key) could have written andsigned this verification message.

Notably, as shown in FIG. 5, similar zero-knowledge storage andreporting of the PII information may also be performed by the AVS serverfor sharing reports with the compliance device 550, e.g., sharing KYCPII information with the government for flagged financial transactions.For instance, the compliance device 550 may send a report request 592 toan enterprise 530 (e.g., a compliance report) in response to any numberof triggers. Since the mobile device 520 also has obtained thecompliance device's public key (Gov PubK) 593, it can then also create acompliance-device-based rekeying key 594 through an encryptingcombination of the source decryption key (e.g., private key, U PriK) ofthe source device and the compliance device public key (Gov PubK).Accordingly, by sending the compliance-device-based rekeying key 594 tothe storage server 510, and in response to the report request 592, thestorage server re-encrypts (e.g., is caused to re-encrypt) thesource-encrypted source data 586 (and optionally other report-relateddata) with the compliance-device-based rekeying key 594, where there-encrypting results in the source/PII data being encrypted with thecompliance device public key (compliance-device-based encrypted sourcedata 595). Note still that the storage server is unable to decrypt thesource data encrypted with the compliance device public key (i.e.,compliance-device-based encrypted source data 595). The storage server510 may then send the compliance-device-based encrypted source data 595to the compliance device 550, which can then apply its own private keyto obtain and process the user's identity information (and optionallyother report data) from the previously encrypted source data (i.e.,decrypting the compliance-device-based encrypted source data using acompliance device private key of the compliance device).

As mentioned above, and with reference now to environment 600 of FIG. 6,in addition to original onboarding attestation of a particular user,there are challenges presented when verifying a user 605 (e.g., a user605 a via the mobile device 520 with an AVS client app 525 or a user 605b without the app 525) via web/SMS 660 or PSTN 665 connecting to acontact center 635 (a human and/or IVR), whether inbound or outbound. Inparticular, the challenge addressed by the techniques herein, and asdescribed in greater detail below, is to determine whether theconnecting user is a verified bank-authenticated(enterprise-authenticated) user or a generic non-verified user. Also,the techniques herein address whether an unverified connecting userattempts to appear as a verified connecting user, and how to mark it asan “attack”. Furthermore, the techniques herein may detect the level ofthreat/attack, e.g., via a spoofed call ID, and may change the requiredlevel of MFA/authentication based on that level of threat (i.e., for theappropriate level of identify assurance). Additionally, the architecture600 illustrated in FIG. 6 assures that the called party, in an outboundscenario, is actually being contacted by the enterprise indicated by thecaller ID and not by a hacker pretending to be that enterprise. In yetanother aspect of the embodiments herein, the enterprise does not needto disclose to the called party any private secured information otherthan the caller ID in order to assure the caller that they are beingcontacted by the enterprise that the caller ID claims. This preventsleakage of information in case the mobile device is answered by a partyother than the intended party, particularly for unexpected calls (whereexpected, e.g., requested calls, may give the called party furtherconfidence that the enterprise is in fact who they claim to be, sincethe call may be in response to or at a requested time of a call-back.

According to the techniques herein, to verify a user, and thus toestablish an “AVS-verified” user (i.e., verified according to thetechniques herein), there are two primary use cases to follow below:

-   -   1. As illustrated in FIGS. 7-8, a user calling through an        (embedded) AVS App, either a standalone verification app or an        app associated with a particular enterprise; or    -   2. As illustrated in FIGS. 9-10, a user calling through a mobile        phone which has the AVS App installed.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example architecture 700 for user verification,particularly an inbound scenario where an “AVS user” 705 (a user withthe AVS app) calls from the AVS app itself. In particular (and asdenoted with corresponding step numbers in circles in the drawing):

-   -   1. A user 705 accesses the AVS app 525 on their mobile device        520 and is verified through authentication (i.e., is a verified        customer for this enterprise contact center). The authentication        may involve fingerprint, facial authentication, iris        recognition, password, challenge questions, or any other        authentication mechanism required by the AVS authentication.        Note that the authentication may specifically take place through        an API 725 with an MFA module 726. Note also that the user may        be calling by invoking phone communication module 727 via API        725 from an AVS generic application or from a specific        enterprise application (which embeds an AVS App), e.g., the        enterprise is a bank, and the user is calling from the bank's        own mobile application.    -   2. At this time:        -   a. the AVS app may alert the AVS Access Control Gateway            (ACG) 734, e.g., via the AVS server 510, about an incoming            contact from a verified user ID (e.g., in response to a            contact initiation by the verified user);        -   b. the verification of the authentication/MFA is sent to the            AVS server;        -   c. and then the user initiates contact via Web/SMS 660            (e.g., a specific address, which may be known publicly or            only via the app); or        -   d. else via PSTN 665 (e.g., a specific phone number, such as            “1-800-special #” as shown, which may be known publicly or            else only through the app—optionally using only an            internally known number as a number from which the ACD is            willing to accept verified contacts).    -   3. In response:        -   a. the AVS server 510 relays the notification to expect a            contact from an AVS verified user (including identification            such as caller ID, IP address, etc.) to the AVS access            control gateway (ACG) 734; which is then:        -   b. received over Web/SMS 660; or        -   c. received over PSTN 665.    -   4. Once the contact is received from the pre-verified user, the        AVS ACG 734 verifies that the contact is from the same user for        whom the notification has been received within a predetermined        time window, and determines that the contact was initiated by a        verified user. The AVS ACG then notifies the ACD 732 that the        incoming contact is from an authenticated/verified user.    -   5. ACD contact center 732 can then treat the user as an        authenticated contact (e.g., authenticated contact treatment at        agent 736, as opposed to unauthenticated contact treatment at        agent 738, which may be the same agent just with different        verification, or may be a different agent or routing for        unauthenticated users generally).

Note that transferring a call to an agent may have a message thatcarries relevant associated (e.g., minimal) data, such as an indicationthat the contact has been verified and authenticated, an Account Number,Name, MFA level, etc. According to the techniques herein, the messagedisplayed to the agent contains no password, no date of birth (DOB), orany other sensitive information. Abstraction of the customer PII asrelevant for the call (e.g., age group instead of DOB, VIP customerinstead of account balance and transactions, etc.), may, however, beincluded, if such information is deemed relevant to the particularcontact center.

Note further that for incoming calls, there are generally two optionshere: a.) the call center has a single incoming number, e.g., 1-800-num1number, and all calls to the contact center are coming through thatnumber and through the AVS ACG; b.) the call center has two numbers: onenumber, e.g., 1-800-num1, which is configured in the AVS client and isintended for use by AVS clients and another number, e.g., 1-800-num2,which is a public number for generic non-authenticated callers to thecontact center. In this scenario, only those contacts that arrive at thefirst number, e.g., 1-800-num1, are processed by the flow describedabove (provided they were alerted by the AVS server). Contacts arrivingat the second number, e.g., 1-800-num2, are marked as unverified, andare treated as contacts from un-authenticated callers.

In case an unauthenticated caller, e.g., a caller without an AVS client,gets hold of the first number, e.g., 1-800-num1, and uses it to contactthe call center, the call is received at the AVS ACG. In response, theAVS ACG 734 starts a timer 712 to monitor a predetermined time window.Since the AVS server 510 does not get a notification from the AVS client525 within a pre-configured time-window, the timer 712 in the AVS serverexpires signaling to the AVS ACG that the call is from anunauthenticated caller. The call is then transferred for treatment as anunverified caller. Also, if the contact is received at the first number,e.g., 1-800-num, the contact may be marked as a potential fraudulentcontact.

Those skilled in the art should recognize that each time a call arrivesat the AVS ACG, the AVS ACG sends a message to the AVS timer whichstarts the measurement of preconfigured time-window. If a notificationarrives from the AVS client alerting of an incoming call from the samecaller ID before the timer expires, the timer is reset and the AVS ACGis notified of the incoming call as being a qualified call from anauthenticated caller. Similarly, if the notification from the AVS clientarrives first, the notification sets the timer for the pre-configuredtimeout. If the call from a caller with the same caller ID arrivesbefore the timer expires, the call is again qualified as arriving froman authenticated caller. Otherwise, if the timer expires, the call isqualified as coming from an unauthenticated caller and is marked as suchwhen it is transferred to the ACD.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example flowchart detailing a procedure 800 fromthe point of view of the access control gateway (ACG) in FIG. 7 above.In particular, the procedure starts in step 805, then when the ACGreceives an incoming contact in step 810, the ACG determines in step 815whether it has received a “verified” notification (msgs) from the AVSserver for the same caller ID, IP address, etc. If not, then in step 820the caller is marked for an “unknown caller” treatment and istransferred as such to the ACD to be treated by the ACD agent as anunverified contact. Alternatively, if the ACG receives an indicationthat the AVS server verified that contact in step 815, then the calleris deemed to be known and verified, and is marked for being treatedaccordingly in step 825 resulting in a frictionless treatment by the ACDagent.

FIG. 9 illustrates the example architecture 900 for user verification,now where an AVS user 905 (a valid but yet to be authenticated customerfor this enterprise), with the AVS app 525, calls the contact centerdirectly from a mobile phone 520 (rather than from the AVS client 525).As shown:

-   -   1. A (yet-to-be-determined-as-verified) user 905 gets hold of        his/her mobile device 520.    -   2. The user connects (e.g., via Web/SMS 660, or PSTN 665) to the        contact center at enterprise 530 directly via the mobile phone        (e.g., using the dialer of the mobile phone and directly dialing        the call center number, e.g., 1-800-num1, or by texting/sending        SMS message to the same number).    -   3. As the contact arrives at the AVS ACG 734, it sends a message        to the AVS server 510 notifying it of the incoming contact. This        notification starts a timer 712 with a pre-configured duration        in the AVS Server.    -   4. The same (or a second dedicated message) triggers a txt or        SMS message from the AVS server 510 to mobile device 520 (of the        user which initiated the contact in bullet 2 above) requesting        authentication. In accordance with a specific example        embodiment, the AVS server and the AVS client maintain a        dedicated encrypted connection via which the message is        communicated. Notably, the message sent can also be a branded        notification message that is sent from the mobile AVS app 525        (e.g., where this type of message will be seen by the customer        as more likely being from the enterprise).    -   5. When the client 905 sees the indication he/she invokes the        AVS client 525 and authenticates himself using the AVS client        (note that the AVS application may be invoked by a bot 925 to        initiate MFA queries).    -   6. Upon verifying the authentication, the AVS client 525 replies        to the AVS server 510 that the caller 905 has been        authenticated.    -   7. Prior to the timer 712 expiring, the user verification is        sent to the AVS server.    -   8. In this case, the verification of the caller is sent to the        AVS ACG 734 and the timer is disarmed. Since the user is        verified, he/she is given authenticated contact treatment by the        contact center, accordingly. That is, once the contact is        received from the pre-verified user, the ACD contact center 732        can then treat the user as an authenticated contact. (Note again        that transferring the call to agent 736 may carry associated        data, e.g., Account #, Name, MFA level, as well as abstracted        PII information, but still no password, DOB, or other sensitive        info.)    -   9. However, if the notification from the AVS client does not        arrive before the timer 712 expires (or does not arrive at all),        the timer expires and a timer expiration notification is sent        accordingly to the AVS ACG 734.    -   10. Upon receiving the notification that the timer had expired,        the incoming contact is marked as a contact from an        unauthenticated user. The contact is transferred to the ACD and        is treated accordingly with a treatment reserved for        unauthenticated contacts (e.g., by agent 738).

FIG. 10 illustrates another example flowchart detailing a procedure 1000now for FIG. 9 above. Here, the procedure starts in step 1005, and thenwhen the ACG receives an incoming contact in step 1010, it determineswhether it has previously received a verified acknowledgment messagefrom the AVS server in step 1015 (e.g., if an installed AVS client isrunning and has verified the identity). If not, and if step 1020determines that the AVS app is not installed on the mobile phone (e.g.,at least for this user, or is not associated for this user with thisenterprise), then the caller is treated as an unknown caller in step1025. However, if the caller is verified by the AVS app in step 1015,then the caller is treated as a known and verified caller in step 1030.

In the event the caller is not verified first by the AVS server in step1015, but the user does have the AVS client in step 1020, e.g., with theverification application on their mobile device (and the AVS client ofthe user is associated with the enterprise), then the AVS applicationmay be invoked (e.g., to activate a non-running/non-open application),such as by a bot or by a message from the AVS server in step 1035 toinitiate MFA queries in step 1040 (e.g., asking for a biometric proof ofidentity through the application). If at this point the MFA can verifythe caller in step 1045, then the caller is marked as an authenticatedcaller and is given verified (authenticated) caller treatment in step1050. On the other hand, if not, then the caller may be marked as apotential attack in step 1055 (i.e., has the AVS application, but cannotbe verified by MFA 726).

FIG. 11 illustrates the architectural flow 1100 for such a non-verifieduser. As shown:

-   -   1. A (yet-to-be-determined-as-unverified) user 1105 gets hold of        a mobile device 520.    -   2. The user connects (e.g., via Web/SMS 660, or PSTN 665) to the        contact center 530 by using the dialer of the mobile phone        (phone module 727) and directly dialing the call center number,        e.g., 1-800-num1, or by texting/sending SMS message to the same        (or other corresponding) number.    -   3. As the contact arrives at the AVS ACG 734, it sends a message        to the AVS server 510 notifying it of the incoming call. This        notification starts a timer 712 with a pre-configured duration        in the AVS Server.    -   4. The same (or a second dedicated message) triggers a text or        SMS message from the AVS server to mobile device 520 (of the        user 1105 which initiated the contact in bullet 2 above)        requesting authentication.    -   5. Either because the user who initiated the contact does not        have an AVS client on his mobile device or because the user has        an AVS client but fails to authenticate himself as instructed, a        verifying message is not returned from the mobile device to the        AVS server.    -   6. Consequently, the timer expires before the user can be        verified, and a timer expiration notification is returned to the        AVS ACG 734. Note that the techniques herein may also detect the        level of threat or “attack”, e.g., via the spoofed caller ID or        otherwise, and may change a required level of authentication/MFA        based on that level of threat (e.g., requiring facial        identification, rather than merely a passcode). For example, if        the system detects that a caller presents a valid caller ID that        belongs to the enterprise's customer, e.g., a bank customer, but        failed to authenticate themselves, the system keeps track of        this event and marks it as an attempt to misuse the caller ID.        The system can then ask a caller with the same caller ID to        authenticate themselves with additional factors such as voice        recognition, facial recognition, etc.    -   7. Since the user is not verified, the contact is marked as        unauthenticated contact and the contact is routed for        unauthenticated treatment 738 by the contact center 732,        accordingly.

Similar to FIG. 10, FIG. 12 illustrates an example flowchart forprocedure 1200 adding the demonstration of the timeout for AVS not beinginstalled on the mobile device, and for the potential attack level beingincremented (e.g., per caller ID), as mentioned above. As illustratedand detailed below, when the timer in the AVS Server times out, thesystem concludes that the contact is from a user who has not beenauthenticated and as a result the contact is routed for treatmentreserved for unknown/unauthenticated contacts.

Specifically, the procedure 1200 starts in step 1205, and then when theACG receives an incoming contact in step 1210, it determines whether ithas received a verified acknowledgment message from the AVS server instep 1215 (e.g., an AVS app is installed and has verified the identity).If not, and if the AVS app is not installed on the mobile phone (e.g.,at least for this enterprise) in step 1220, then once the timer in theAVS Server times out in step 1222, the caller is treated as an unknowncaller in step 1225. If the caller is verified by the AVS app in step1215, then the caller is treated as a known and verified caller in step1230. If the contact was directed at a dedicated number e.g., 1-800-Num1which is reserved for calls/contacts from the AVS client the callattempt is identified as a potential security threat and is dealt withaccordingly.

In the event the caller is not verified first by the AVS server in step1215, but the user does have the AVS client in step 1220, e.g., withverification application on their mobile device, then the AVSapplication may be invoked (e.g., activating an otherwiseun-opened/minimized/non-running application) by a bot or by a messagefrom the AVS server in step 1235 to initiate MFA queries in step 1240(e.g., an MFA IVR/agent asking for a proof of identity through theapplication). (In accordance with another example aspect of thetechniques herein, the AVS client is always active on the mobile deviceand does not need to be explicitly invoked.) If at this point the MFAcan verify the caller in step 1245, then the caller is marked as anauthenticated caller and is given verified/known caller treatment instep 1250. On the other hand, if not, then the caller may be marked as apotential attack in step 1255 (i.e., has the AVS application, but cannotbe verified by MFA). As noted, the techniques herein may mark attemptsto misuse a caller ID and may increment a potential attack level (e.g.,to cause the agent to be on higher alert, or requiring greaterauthentication or limited services) in step 1257.

FIG. 13 illustrates an example architecture view 1300 of the contactcenter 732 of the enterprise 530 making an outbound call to a user'sphone number (or other contacting identification, such as for VoIP,video calls, text message, etc.). As shown:

-   -   1. The ACD contact center 732 initiates a contact to a customer        (“called user”) 1305 (e.g., based on a trigger, a queue, etc.).    -   2. The contact is extended by the AVS ACG 734 to the user (e.g.,        via web/SMS 660 or PSTN 665).    -   3. At substantially the same time, the enterprise also initiates        an outbound called party verification process through the AVS        server 510, as well as a process to reassure the called party        that the contact request is from a valid enterprise and not a        spoofed call.    -   4. An SMS message may be sent from the AVS server 510 to the        caller ID of the party (mobile device 520 of user 1305),        requesting authentication.    -   5. Alternatively, or in addition, if the AVS application 525 is        installed/running, a notification may be sent from the AVS        server directly to the AVS client app, requesting        authentication. In either case, whether the AVS client was        running on the mobile device or is invoked based on the request        from the AVS Server, the AVS client exchanges messages with the        AVS server, verifies that the contact was initiated by the        enterprise, e.g., the bank, and provides the called party with        assurance that the incoming contact is not from a hacker who        spoofed the caller ID of the enterprise, e.g., the bank.    -   6. The solicited verification may then be performed (successful        or not).    -   7. A timer 712 may have been set to allow a set amount of time        for a successful authentication to occur.    -   8. The determination as to whether to acknowledge the answering        party 1305 as the verified intended user (for authenticated        contact treatment 736) or an unverified (for unauthenticated        contact treatment 738) may then be returned from the AVS ACG 734        to the ACD contact center 732 and associated agent. In case the        timer 712 expires before a message is received from the AVS        client attesting that the intended caller has been        authenticated, the contact is marked as an unauthenticated user.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example flowchart detailing the outboundprocedure 1400 described above in FIG. 13. Specifically, once startingin step 1405, the ACD initiates contact via the AVS ACG (1, 2, and 3above) in step 1410, and then the AVS server attempts to establishconnection with the AVS app on the client (4 and 5 above) in step 1415.If the AVS app is running on the mobile device and the connection isestablished in step 1420, then MFA queries are made on the app in step1425, and the user may be verified using the MFA module of the AVSclient (6 above) in step 1430, resulting in a verified/known callertreatment in step 1435 (8 above). If the user is not verified by the MFAmodule of AVS client in step 1430, by an expired timeout (7 above) instep 1440, then the called party is marked as unverified in step 1445,and treated accordingly (8 above), despite the called device having theAVS app installed and running (e.g., someone else may have answered thecall).

Conversely, if the AVS app is not running on the mobile device in step1420, then it may be invoked (activated) via a bot and the AVS server instep 1450, and notifications (alerts) or SMS/text messages may be sentto have the user invoke the AVS app on the mobile device in step 1455.In accordance with another embodiment (not shown) the AVS clientapplication always runs in the background. If the AVS app is determinedto be running in step 1460 before a timeout in step 1465, then MFAqueries may be made in step 1425 as mentioned above. However, if the AVSapp fails to establish communication with the AVS server (e.g., it doesnot get started) in step 1460 before the expiration of the timer in step1465, then the person answering the call is marked as unauthenticated instep 1470 and is treated as an unverified person (8 above), who notablymay not have the AVS client installed or running.

For a better understanding of the techniques herein, FIGS. 15A-15Iillustrate an example of illustrations related to a visual walkthroughof one or more embodiments herein from the perspective of a user'smobile application (e.g., for a bank) and of a contact center agent'sapplication (e.g., desktop app). As mentioned above, the techniquesherein establish a secure and private data channel between a user'smobile app and a contact center app, which provides authentication priorto connecting a call/communication channel (e.g., biometric-basedauthentication or otherwise), behavioral and historical call routing,and zero knowledge requests for information. In addition, the techniquesherein improve outbound connect rates with branded messages andfrictionless authentication. Moreover, authenticating the to-be-verifiedparty (called party or calling party) without involving agent results inimproved efficiency/productivity of the enterprise/call center.

As shown in FIG. 15A, an example call center application such as anagent desktop (view 1505) is shown illustrating various statusinformation which is provided to the contact center agent about a givenuser, who at this point, remains un-contacted and un-verified. The callcenter agent could be manually examining a customer's information, orelse an automated alert may have triggered a reason for connecting witha user, such as a suspected fraud confirmation, or any other reason. Inanother example, a queue of users/customers may need to be called (e.g.,for larger lists of calls that need to be made, such as for marketing,account changes, product recall, medical alert, etc.), and in thisinstance the techniques herein may be integrated with contact centercomputer telephony integration (CTI) to recognize when a user's numberis approaching the top of a list manager's call queue.

Either by manually pressing a notification button in the agent's app(e.g., the “notify fraud” button 1506 at the bottom of the app), or elsethrough programmatic triggers, a customizable (e.g., branded)notification may be sent to a user's preferred device(s) (e.g., mobiledevice view 1510 with pop-up notification 1511) to alert them of anupcoming call.

When the user taps the notification, it may open the associated companyapp (e.g., bank app), which as shown in FIG. 15B (view 1515) may requestauthentication of the user (e.g., authenticating with facial recognition1516, fingerprint, etc.). When the AVS app/client is invoked it connectswith the AVS server and over a secured connection verifies that thecontact is being initiated by the enterprise, e.g., by the bank. Thecalled party is then notified that the incoming contact request is froma valid enterprise, e.g., the bank, and not from a hacker who attemptsto spoof the caller id of the bank. Upon authentication, the user'sapplication may then be opened (view 1520), and the user may bedelivered to a notification center to see more details regarding thisnotification (e.g., and any other previous notifications), as shown inFIG. 15C (view 1525, notifications 1526). Now, the user has theopportunity to tap an option to “request a call about this” (1527),which invokes an authenticated contact treatment and ensures that theuser will not be placed at the end of the queue for a generic agent whois unaware of any unique account needs, but rather an agent who is readyto discuss the particular notification and who knows that the user isalready verified.

As shown in FIG. 15C view 1530, the user may be prompted (prompt 1531)to request to be called now, or a callback for later time (e.g.,bringing up FIG. 15D, view 1535, for selecting a suitable date and timein window 1536). When requesting to be called now, since the user isalready biometrically authenticated, the user can bypass anyknowledge-based authentication (KB A) entirely when called by thecontact center. Notably, when being called by the contact center, thecontact center's caller ID will appear (FIG. 15D view 1540, ID 1541),and the call will be at the expected time (now or when requested). Insome example embodiments, the display includes language mentioning tothe called party that this call is in response to their request for acall, e.g., regarding the fraud notification (not shown).

On the agent desktop app (FIG. 15E, view 1545), it can now be seen thatthe caller status has changed to verified (status 1546), while on themobile device (FIG. 15E, view 1550), a banner 1551 shows that the useris now on a verified phone call with a particular agent (e.g., name andID number) and not on a call with a hacker spoofing the contact centerof the enterprise.

Once a secure data channel is established between the agent and thecalled party, the agent has an alternative to asking the user to sharesensitive details, such as by sending a request to verify proof ofhaving a credit card (e.g., clicking “send request” on the agent app forcredit card verification), without having to send the information to theagent. For instance, as shown in FIG. 15F (view 1555), after an agent,on their view 1560 of FIG. 15F, clicks “send request” 1561, the user isprompted to enter security code for the credit card in a pop-up banner1556. Once entered correctly, then the agent desktop may pop up anotification 1562 as confirmation that this card has in fact beenverified, without exposing that sensitive information to the agent.

In addition to the credit card, the agent can also ask for otherinformation, such as social security number (SSN), password,re-authentication (e.g., facial recognition again, or another biometricverification), and so on, as shown in FIG. 15G (view 1565, drop-down box1566). In each of these cases, the user may authenticate the informationon their mobile app, without exposing the information to the agent.

Turning now to an example where the user does not originally accept(push, react to, etc.) the notification sent in FIG. 15A (view 1505)above (e.g., within the 15 minutes), as shown in FIG. 15G (view 1570),the agent may click a “call” button 1571 to directly call the user(shown in view 1570 as clicked and “calling”). The user then receivesthe call (e.g., from the verified caller ID 1576 of the bank, as shownin FIG. 15H, view 1575). It should be noted that because the AVS serverconnected with the AVS client on the user's mobile device, the displayon the user's mobile device may be the AVS client rather than the simpleuser interface of the phone. Upon answering the call the user may beprompted to log into their mobile app (e.g., “If you would like fasterand more personalized experience, please log into your bank app on yourmobile phone to verify yourself”). If the user so chooses, then as shownin FIG. 15H (view 1580), he/she may be prompted to verify his or heridentity with the AVS app (e.g., Face ID 1581), bringing the user to theapp landing page as shown in FIG. 15I (view 1585) with the banner 1586at the top reassuring the user that he is talking with the actualenterprise, e.g., the bank, and not with a hacker spoofing the bank.Similarly, the agent's desktop app also now indicating that the calledparty has been authenticated and verified, as shown in FIG. 15I (view1590, status 1591).

Notably, in the event the user begins the process by calling thebank/company directly, such as by calling the number of the back ofhis/her credit card instead of using the mobile app, then the contactcenter may again prompt the user to log into his or her mobile app(e.g., either as a default, or else after the call center, e.g., usingCTI or an integrated module, recognizes that this user had a mobiledevice with an AVS client and/or the phone number is associated with avalid account). If the user complies, then again this results in averified user before a contact center agent is added to the call (i.e.,authenticating via the mobile app without sharing private informationwith the agent, and all done “pre-answer”, i.e., before the agent wasadded to the call).

In one alternative or additional embodiment to the above description, asession may be initiated as described above, but now while the agentinteracts with the verified customer, assume that the customer mayrequest something that would prompt/require a higher level ofsecurity/verification. For instance, a first level of verification mayallow for information sharing about account balances, while a secondgreater level of verification may be needed for withdrawals or transfersof a large amount of money, e.g., sums larger than $10,000. As a result,either based on agent trigger or based on heuristics that have to dowith the forthcoming transaction (e.g., withdrawal of a large sum ofmoney, or otherwise), the techniques herein may ask the user (caller)for yet another authentication factor/modality, e.g., facial recognitionwhen the previous authentication was merely a passcode or fingerprint.Said differently, this embodiment allows the authentication mechanism tobe dynamically tuned by the system to ask and convey strongerauthentication based on dynamic needs of the communication interaction.

In particular, in certain embodiments herein, even though a user mayalready be authenticated and verified, the techniques herein may allow averifying entity (e.g., the enterprise/call center/agent) to request analready verified user to provide additional information for additionalsecurity. For instance, this higher level of assurance/security (i.e.,an “increased assurance of verification of the identity”) may be neededin various situations, such as, for example, when going from aconversation about an account to requesting a financial transaction, orwhen going from a level of assurance where transactions below $10,000are acceptable based on the original authentication, but once arequested transaction is above $10,000, then a higher security standardmay need to be met. Such verification levels (levels of assurance ofverification of an identity) may be based on an additional securitymeasure (e.g., asking for another security answer), or based on morestringent security measures (e.g., a facial recognition being moresecure than a password), or based on a greater number of securitymeasures (e.g., going from a password to a Social Security number and amother's maiden name), or any combination thereof. Also, according toembodiments herein, the additional authentication may be requestedautomatically (i.e., requesting the increased assurance of verificationof the identity occurs automatically in response to one or more triggersduring the communication) by the enterprise or the call center, and doesnot need intervention by a person/user to trigger this increasedassurance.

According to the techniques herein, therefore, with all contactscenarios above, the agent's desktop shows all of the rich informationabout the individual user that the agent is connected with (e.g., recentapplication views, recent contacts, recent notifications, etc.), andwhether the user's identity has already been verified, such as accordingto the techniques described in greater detail above.

By establishing this secure private data channel between this specificuser and specific security module in the AVS server and/or the AVS ACG,the techniques herein have unlocked access to a rich set of contextualhistorical and behavioral data that can be used to affect call routinglogic and better inform this agent about a unique caller's background,needs, and current situation. Similarly, in an outbound scenario, byassuring the called user that the call is coming from a validauthenticated enterprise, such as a bank, a doctor's office, etc., theuser is more inclined to accept the call resulting in higher callcompletion rate for the enterprise.

FIGS. 16A-22 illustrate example workflows between a user's end device(e.g., smartphone, tablet, etc.) and the contact center's application(e.g., agent desktop app).

As shown in FIGS. 16A-16D, a first example 1600 for pushing an outboundrequest for communication is shown (i.e., the contact center pushes anotification to the user). As shown, in anticipation of an upcomingcall, the bank contact center's outbound contact list manager pushes anotification to the user to alert him/her about an upcoming call (view1605, notification 1606). The user taps the notification, which launchesthe bank's app (view 1610), which triggers the native authenticationprotocol(s) 1611, e.g., FaceID (facial recognition) in this case. Onceauthenticated, the authentication notification is sent to the contactcenter via the AVS Server and the user lands on their primary homescreen (view 1615), and the user sees his/her notification window (view1620), which shows the most recent notification in a list ofnotifications 1621 that initiated this process.

The user taps “Request a call about this” alongside the notification,and then, as shown, the user makes the choice whether they'd like toreceive a call now or schedule it for a later date and time (view 1625,pop-up 1626). If they choose “Schedule for later”, the example flowmoves to view 1630, and the user can select from available (e.g., 15minute) intervals (pop-up 1631). Shortly after (requesting a call “now”and bypassing view 1630), or at the scheduled date and time (set in view1630), the user receives a call from the bank (complete with a matchingcaller ID) (view 1635, ID 1636), at which time the bank agent may saysomething like, “Hello Brett, this is John from the Bank. Thank you forrequesting this call about recent transactions on your account. Youridentity has already been verified through your mobile app, and if youlook at your app, e.g., bank app or AVS app, you'll see you are now on averified phone call.” In the app, the user can now see that they are nowon a verified call (view 1640), as well as the name and ID of theparticular agent from the bank (window 1641). Verified treatment maythen proceed with the called user, accordingly.

FIGS. 17A-17B illustrate another example 1700 where the user ignores theinitial notification. For instance, in anticipation of an upcoming call,the bank contact center's outbound contact list manager pushes anotification to the user to alert them about an upcoming call (view1705, notification 1706), but in this example, the user does not takeany action. At a later time, the user receives a phone call with thecaller ID of the Bank (view 1710, ID 1711), at which time an agent orautomated prompt may prompt the user to log into the app, such as bysaying “Hello, this is the Bank. If you′d like, you can receive fasterand more personalized service on this call by logging into or bringingup your bank mobile app to verify yourself.” The user opens their appand authenticates themselves (view 1715, FaceID 1716). Once theiridentity has been verified, the user may be instructed on the phone thatan agent will be with them momentarily, and once an agent joins thecall, the user and the bank's call center agent can again see that theyare both now on a verified call (view 1720, agent ID window 1721). Here,verified treatment of the called user may again proceed.

FIGS. 18A-18D illustrate an outbound call being requested from the userin example 1800. For instance, as shown, the user opens their mobile app(view 1805), and authenticates himself/herself using his/her mobile AVSapp or bank's app (view 1810, illustrative FaceID 1811). If the usertaps the phone icon in the top left corner (view 1815, icon 1816), thenonce the notification screen pops up (view 1820, pop-up notifications1821), the user may click “Request call about this” next to one of theirnotifications. As shown in view 1825, the user makes the choice whetherthey'd like to receive a call now or schedule it for a later date andtime in selection window 1826. If they choose “Schedule for later”, theycan select from available dates and times (view 1835, selectable options1836). The user receives a call from the bank (complete with a matchingcaller ID) (view 1835, ID 1836), either “now” or at the scheduled time.The bank's agent can see that the user is verified and can see theparticular notification the user had originally selected to discuss (notshown). Since the user's identity has already been verified by his/hermobile app, he/she can open his/her app to see that he/she is now on averified phone call (view 1840, verification window 1841). Once again,the user can now be treated as verified during the call.

FIG. 19 illustrates an example 1900 for when a user calls the bank'sphone number directly (e.g., a number on the back of a credit card). Forexample, the user may choose to call the phone number on the back oftheir credit card, and may then dial it on their mobile device/phone(view 1905). Once answered (e.g., agent or automated), then the user maybe prompted to receive faster and more personalized service on this callby logging into (or bringing up) their bank's mobile app and verifythemselves. Once the user opens their AVS app or bank's app andauthenticates themselves (view 1910, authentication 1911). If theiridentity has been verified with the system, an agent or automated systemcan then treat the caller as verified. By opening the mobile app, theuser can now see the indication that they are now on a verified call(view 1915, verification confirmation 1916).

FIGS. 20A-20B illustrate a further example 2000, where the user hasopened their app, but has not yet logged in or alternatively beenauthenticated (i.e., an inbound call pre-login or authentication). Inthis example, as shown in view 2005, the user launches their mobile appand may have the option to perform various “unsecure” operations 2006(such as finding local bank branches, reading informational articles,accessing frequently asked questions (FAQs), etc.). The user may, atsome point of their navigation, tap a “Call” button 2007 on the screen.This may now trigger the app to authenticate the user if not alreadyauthenticated (view 2010, authentication 2011). In other words, when auser wants to use the app, he/she may first authenticate himself/herselfbefore doing anything, including make a call, or else as in example2000, a “call” button may be available during unsecure use of the app,and prior to authenticating and thus entering a secured session. Onceauthenticated, the user's phone dialer is opened with the Bank's numberentered and ready to call (view 2015). An automated system or live agentmay then engage the user as a verified user, e.g., “Hello Brett, this isJohn from the Bank. Your identity has already been verified through yourmobile app, and if you open your app you'll see you are now on averified phone call. How can I help you today?” The user can see thatthey are now on a verified call (view 2020, verification information2021), and be treated accordingly.

FIGS. 21A-21B illustrate a further example 2100 where now the user hasopened their app and has logged in (i.e., an inbound call post login).In particular, as shown in FIG. 21A, the user opens their mobile app(view 2105), and authenticates themselves to their mobile app (view2110, authentication 2111). Now, while in secure view of the app (view2115), the user has the option to tap a phone icon 2116 (e.g., as shownin the top left corner). As shown in FIG. 21B in view 2120, if the userselects this icon, a popup notification window 2121 may allow the userto click a “CALL” button 2122 at the top of their call/notificationwindow. Note that other illustrative techniques for initiating a callfrom a mobile app will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, andthose shown herein are merely examples. The user's phone dialer is thenopened with the Bank's phone number entered and ready to call (view2125), or optionally auto-dialing the number. Upon contact centeranswering of the call, the user's identify is already verified, and byopening the app, the user can see that they are now on a verified call(view 2130, verification 2131), and will be treated accordingly.

As still another example, FIG. 22 illustrates an example “zeroknowledge” request and verification process 2200. For instance, assumethat the contact center or the agent of the call center, presently on averified phone call with a customer, sends a request to the user'sdevice for the user to verify the last 4-digits of their social securitynumber (view 2205, drop-down box 2206 selecting SSN for verification).Note that as shown in the caller status 2207, the user is alreadyverified, and thus this may be an example of an additional level ofverification (e.g., based on higher security needs before proceedingwith a particular transaction or sharing certain information). In view2210, the user receives the request (pop-up window 2211) and can chooseto confirm the last 4 digits in their app rather than telling them tothe agent. The agent cannot see any digits of the customer's SSN, butthey receive a notification that the 4-digits that the customer enteredhave been verified by the bank's back-end system (view 2215,verification notification 2216). Note that the verification status 2207may remain “verified”, or may indicate a certain level of verification(not shown).

Other example workflows may be presented, and those illustrated hereinare not meant to be limiting to the scope of embodiments afforded by thetechniques herein.

Notably, for one additional embodiment, it is important to point outthat one of the reasons that companies ask for new identity informationevery time a call is transferred between applications or between agentsis that the security teams are reluctant to allow identity data to betransferred via a CTI link, since they either don't understand, don'ttrust, or don't have the proper security. As such, in this particularembodiment, with reference to environment 2300 of FIG. 23, an identitytoken 2310 may be created as soon as the customer 2305 is verified,rating the veracity of the customer verification (e.g., from fullytrusted down to completely unverified), and moving the identity tokenaround between apps and agents as the customer is moved around (e.g.,from agent 2331 to agent 2332). As shown, the token is generated by theAVS client 525, but in other embodiments, the token may be establishedby any trusted authority receiving the verification (e.g., the AVSserver 510 or enterprise 530). In accordance with yet another aspect ofthe embodiments herein, rather than passing the token 2310 between thedifferent apps/agents, the AVS client application 525 on the mobiledevice may issue a new security token 2315 on demand in response to anyauthenticated application that requests it. This prevents a single tokenfrom being over-used and compromised (i.e., each verification token is“unexchangeable”). These embodiments would thus allow for greateracceptance of providing verified identity, while alleviating a lot ofperceived customer friction such as customers being asked by eachdifferent application/agent on a single phone call to be authenticated.

Advantageously, the techniques described herein thus provide accesscontrol, assurance that the user is called by a valid enterprise ratherby a hacker spoofing the ID of the enterprise, as well as userverification for a contact center. In particular, the techniques hereinallow for both end-users (e.g., a customer and a company or any twoend-users) to verify their identity to each other through frictionlessuser experiences with the stringent security required to preventimproper use or abuse of their data. Also, the techniques herein furtherprovide consumers greater control over who has access to their secureinformation, such as by authenticating through an app without sharingsecret information with the company or its representatives (e.g.,completely removing the agent from the call authentication). Thetechniques herein also reduce average call handling time, which benefitsthe user's experience as well as the company's expenses (e.g.,cost-per-minute, staffing needs, etc.). Moreover, the techniques hereinincrease self-service containment, as customers are not expected toenter pins, account numbers, or answer knowledge-based authenticationquestions. Additionally, by assuring that a call is arriving to a userfrom a verified enterprise, e.g., a bank, and not from an entity thatspoofs the caller ID of the enterprise, the rate of call completion(answered/accepted calls) of outbound calls from the enterpriseincreases, resulting in higher call center productivity.

In addition, the solutions herein thus offer highly reliable pre-answeras well as post-answer authentication (e.g., adaptive authentication/MFAto prevent cross-channel fraud, including account takeover), that notonly verifies users seamlessly, but also protects against internalattacks (avoiding the contact center agent from needing or seeing thecustomer's PII), and also avoids the AVS server from having knowledgeof, or even access to, the connecting user's PII. For instance, whileMFA is a known technique for verification, sending a user a text messageor email to their device merely confirms the device, and not theparticular user. Moreover, most MFA techniques require the user toconvey the pin/code/answer to the operator at the other end of the call,which again may cause problems with regard to privacy if the operator isan unscrupulous party. On the contrary, the techniques herein usedifferent channels (communication and verification channels), andmaintain privacy of the various authentication factors used during thevalidation (in addition to the PII, and so on). Additionally, as theuser changes the nature of the ongoing transaction, e.g., the amount ofmoney to be transferred, the system may require a different level ofauthentication and consequently automatically invoke an additional MFAmeans. For example, the interaction may start with user authenticationbased on fingerprint. As the system detects that the amount of money theuser attempts to transfer is greater than a specific threshold, e.g.,$10,000, the system automatically and without intervention by a bankagent requests an additional authentication level by presenting the userwith, for example, a facial recognition demand.

It is important to note that the techniques herein are not limited toinbound user-to-enterprise communications or outbound enterprise-to-usercommunications, but may be generally applicable to any user-to-user(person-to-person) communication or device-to-device communicationswhere one device has an associated identity that needs to be verified tothe other device (or user of the other device). That is, the identity ofany entity (i.e., an identity of an entity associated with a particulardevice) may be verified herein, whether that entity is a person, adevice itself, an enterprise, and so on. Moreover, while the descriptionherein often refers to the example of a contact center (or call center)for an enterprise, the present disclosure also applies to anyinteraction with enterprises which is either have or do not have acontact center. In addition, though mentioned above, it is worthpointing out that both sides of a communication may request verificationof the other corresponding side, prior to or during the communication.For example, though the use-case above is generally directed to anenterprise (e.g., bank) requiring verification of the customer, thetechniques herein also allow the customer to request/obtain verificationof the enterprise's identity as well (e.g., confirming that the customeris, in fact, talking to an agent of his/her bank). Also, while thedescription herein often describes the request for authentication to beinvoked by an agent, it should be understood that the request may beinvoked either by a person using a device or automatically by a devicebased on a preprogramed or configured policy.

Illustratively, the techniques described herein may be performed byhardware, software, and/or firmware, such as in accordance with the“access and verification” process 248, which may include computerexecutable instructions executed by a processor 220 (of a particularcorrespondingly operative computing device 200) to perform functionsrelating to the techniques described herein, e.g., in conjunction withother devices which may have a correspondingly configured access andverification process 248 depending upon the functionality of the device,as described below (e.g., a user device, a storage server, a call centerdevice, a controller device, an attestation service, and so on).

FIG. 24 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when receiving acommunication from an entity to be verified. For example, a non-generic,specifically configured device (e.g., device 200, such as an end device(mobile device, any one or more of the enterprise devices, etc.)) mayperform procedure 2400 by executing stored instructions (e.g., process248). The procedure 2400 may start at step 2405, and continues to step2410, where, as described in greater detail above, a receiving device(e.g., an enterprise 530) receives a communication from an initiatingdevice (e.g., a mobile device 520) on a communication channel. In step2415, the receiving device determines, over a verification channel witha verification service (e.g., AVS server 510), whether an identityassociated with the initiating device is verified by the verificationservice. As described above, verification of the identity may occurbased on a verification service client application (e.g., AVS app 525)being logged in, initiated, or installed, accordingly.

Notably, as described herein, whether an identity associated with aparticular device is verified or unverified may be based on a number ofauthentication factors depending upon the particular “identity” being(or not being) verified. Generally, as used herein, term “identity” mayrefer to the identity of a person who is actually communicating on thedevice (e.g., holding the mobile device). Since anyone may attempt toanswer an incoming call or place an outgoing call from someone else'sdevice, the techniques herein are thus directed to providing assurancethat the identity associated with the device during a communication isverified, e.g., that the identity of person assumed to be communicatingon the device is verified. Accordingly, the “identity” associated with aparticular device may be any corresponding entity, such as an individualperson, an enterprise being verified as a whole, an agent of anenterprise or of a person (e.g., an authorized broker), or an authorizedmachine (e.g., authorized computerized virtual assistants representing aperson). Note also that this verification may occur in either directionof a communication regardless of use case (e.g., a bank customer mayneed to be verified, but may also like to verify that he/she is, infact, speaking to the bank).

Based on the determination of whether the identity is verified orunverified (a “verified/unverified result”) in step 2420, the receivingdevice may then manage, in step 2425 in response to the identityassociated with the initiating device being verified, the communicationfrom the initiating device according to the identity being verified(e.g., allowing certain transactions, sharing or modifying ofinformation, and so on). Examples of how the communication may bemanaged with a verified identity include such things as: sharing secureinformation over the communication; allowing transaction requestsreceived over the communication; modifying information associated withthe verified identity; and continuing the communication.

Alternatively, in step 2430 in response to the identity associated withthe initiating device being unverified, the receiving device manages thecommunication from the initiating device according to the identity beingunverified (e.g., managing the communication from the initiating deviceas a potential attack in certain embodiments as mentioned above). Notethat managing the communication for an unverified identity may involve anumber of actions from which to choose, such as restrictively preventingthe actions listed above (e.g., preventing sharing secure informationover the communication and so on as a security policy), or elseinstructing against such actions (e.g., instructing against sharingsecure information over the communication and so on as a recommendationfor an agent/person). Generally, a notification may be raised toestablish that the communication should be treated as having anunverified identity on the other end of the communication, which mayadjust security policies or may simply adjust personal behavior of theopposite participant. Note that as another option, where an identityremains unverified, the communication may simply be discontinued.

The simplified procedure 2400 may then end in step 2435.

FIG. 25 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when initiating acommunication from an entity to be verified. For example, a non-generic,specifically configured device (e.g., device 200, such as an end device(mobile device, any one or more of the enterprise devices, etc.)) mayperform procedure 2500 by executing stored instructions (e.g., process248). The procedure 2500 may start at step 2505, and continues to step2510, where, as described in greater detail above, an initiating device(e.g., a mobile device 520) initiates a communication to a receivingdevice (e.g., an enterprise 530) on a communication channel, wherein thereceiving device is configured to determine whether an identityassociated with the initiating device is verified by a verificationservice (e.g., AVS server 510). In one embodiment, for example, averification service client application (e.g., AVS app 525) on theinitiating device receives a prompt from the receiving device toinitiate the communication, wherein the verification service clientapplication initiates the communication in response to the prompt.

In step 2515, the initiating device verifies the identity associatedwith the initiating device (e.g., of a user of the mobile device)through a verification service client application on the initiatingdevice. In one embodiment, the verification service client applicationhas verified the identity associated with the initiating device prior toinitiating the communication, and the verification service clientapplication initiates the communication, while the verification serviceclient application also conveys that the identity associated with theinitiating device is verified to the verification service over theverification channel upon initiating the communication on thecommunication channel. In an alternative embodiment, the communicationis initiated prior to the verification service client applicationverifying the identity associated with the initiating device, and theverification service client application is caused to activate during thecommunication to perform verification of the identity associated withthe initiating device. Note that “activating” may mean logging into theverification service (e.g., a user providing a password, FaceID, etc.),which provides at least a first manner for the identity to beauthenticated/verified. Alternatively, “activating” may imply opening ofan application (i.e., the application is installed on the device, but isnot running), where the application (e.g., the AVS client app 525) mayperform the verification (e.g., requesting/receiving one or moreauthentication factors).

In step 2520, in response to the identity associated with the initiatingdevice being verified by the verification service client application,the initiating device conveys that the identity associated with theinitiating device is verified to the verification service over averification channel. The verification service is thus caused to convey,to the receiving device over the verification channel, that the identityassociated with the initiating device is verified.

As such, in step 2525, the initiating device may continue, with thereceiving device, the communication on the communication channel,wherein the receiving device is caused, in response to the identityassociated with the initiating device being verified, to manage thecommunication from the initiating device according to the identity beingverified. The simplified procedure 2500 may then end in step 2530.

FIG. 26 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when initiating acommunication to an entity to be verified. For example, a non-generic,specifically configured device (e.g., device 200, such as an end device(mobile device, any one or more of the enterprise devices, etc.)) mayperform procedure 2600 by executing stored instructions (e.g., process248). The procedure 2600 may start at step 2605, and continues to step2610, where, as described in greater detail above, an initiating device(e.g., an enterprise 530) initiates a communication to a receivingdevice (e.g., mobile device 520) on a communication channel. In certainembodiments, the initiating device may inform a verification service(e.g., AVS server 510), over a verification channel, of an intention toinitiate the communication to the receiving device, causing theverification service to relay the intention to the receiving device. Incertain other embodiments, the initiating device may receive aprompt/response from a verification service client application on thereceiving device to initiate the communication, such that the initiatingdevice initiates the communication in response to the prompt. In eitherevent, the intention and/or response may be associated with a particulartime of initiating the communication, as noted above.

In step 2615, the initiating device may then determine, over averification channel with a verification service, whether an identityassociated with the receiving device is verified by the verificationservice (e.g., based on an invoked verification service clientapplication that verifies the identity).

Based on the result in step 2620, then, in response to the identityassociated with the receiving device being verified, the initiatingdevice manages the communication to the receiving device in step 2625according to the identity being verified. Conversely, in step 2630 inresponse to the identity associated with the receiving device beingunverified, the initiating device manages the communication to thereceiving device according to the identity being unverified. Thesimplified procedure 2600 may then end in step 2635.

FIG. 27 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications in accordance withone or more embodiments described herein, particularly when receiving acommunication at an entity to be verified. For example, a non-generic,specifically configured device (e.g., device 200, such as an end device(mobile device, any one or more of the enterprise devices, etc.)) mayperform procedure 2700 by executing stored instructions (e.g., process248). The procedure 2700 may start at step 2705, and continues to step2710, where, as described in greater detail above, a receiving device(e.g., mobile device 520) receives a communication from an initiatingdevice (e.g., enterprise 530) on a communication channel, wherein theinitiating device is configured to determine whether an identityassociated with the receiving device is verified by a verificationservice (e.g., AVS server 510). As noted above, the communication may bebased on intentions to initiate the communication, prompts to initiatethe communication, setting certain times to initiate the communication,and so on.

In step 2715, the receiving device verifies the identity associated withthe receiving device (e.g., of a user of the receiving device) through averification service client application (e.g., AVS app 525) on thereceiving device. In one embodiment, the verification service clientapplication has verified the identity associated with the receivingdevice prior to receiving the communication, and the verificationservice client application conveys that the identity associated with thereceiving device is verified to the verification service over theverification channel upon receiving the communication on thecommunication channel. In another embodiment, the communication isreceived prior to the verification service client application verifyingthe identity associated with the receiving device, and the verificationservice client application is caused to activate during thecommunication to perform verification of the identity associated withthe receiving device.

In step 2720, in response to the identity associated with the receivingdevice being verified by the verification service client application,the receiving device conveys to the verification service over averification channel that the identity associated with the receivingdevice is verified, such that the verification service is caused toconvey, to the initiating device over the verification channel, that theidentity associated with the receiving device is verified. (Note that asdescribed herein, the receiving device may receive one or moreauthentication factors input, but conveying that the identity associatedwith the receiving device is verified may be completed in a manner thatmay prevent (or at least not require) access to the one or moreauthentication factors by at least the initiating device, and in certainembodiments also the verification service, itself.)

Accordingly, in step 2725, the receiving device continues thecommunication with the receiving device on the communication channel,where the initiating device is caused, in response to the identityassociated with the receiving device being verified, to manage thecommunication to the receiving device according to the identity beingverified. The simplified procedure 2700 may then end in step 2730.

FIG. 28 illustrates an example simplified procedure for providing accesscontrol and identity verification for communications between aninitiating device and a recipient device in accordance with one or moreembodiments described herein. For example, a non-generic, specificallyconfigured device (e.g., device 200, such as an AVS server 510) mayperform procedure 2800 by executing stored instructions (e.g., process248). The procedure 2800 may start at step 2805, and continues to step2810, where, as described in greater detail above, a server (e.g., AVSserver 510) receives, over a verification channel, a notification of acommunication on a communication channel between a first device and asecond device. In one example, the first device is an initiating deviceof the communication to the second device as a receiving device. Inanother example, the second device is an initiating device of thecommunication to the first device as the receiving device. Also, in oneexample, the notification is received from the second device, while instill another example, the notification is received from the firstdevice.

In step 2815, the server may correspondingly determine whether anidentity associated with the first device is verified. As described indetail above, this may involve such things as receiving a verificationof the identity from a verification service client application (e.g.,AVS app 525) on the first device over the verification channel,performing verification of the identity with the first device over theverification channel, invoking a verification service client applicationon the first device to obtain verification (such as initiating theverification service client application on the first device (e.g., a“pop up message), prompting the first device to install the verificationservice client application, and so on).

In step 2820, the server may then inform, to the second device over theverification channel, whether the identity associated with the firstdevice is verified, such that the second device is caused to manage thecommunication according to whether the identity of the first device isverified, as described in greater detail herein. The simplifiedprocedure 2800 may then end in step 2825.

It should be noted that the steps shown and described in the proceduresabove are merely examples for illustration, and certain other steps maybe included or excluded as desired. For instance, other steps may alsobe included generally within procedures above as described herein. Forexample, such steps (whether additional steps or furtherance of stepsalready specifically illustrated above) may include such things as: howcommunications are managed based on verified/unverified identities, howverification occurs, various timers, procedures for increased identityverification requests, displaying verification/assurance levels,generating and passing verification tokens, and so on. Further, while aparticular order of the steps is shown, this ordering is merelyillustrative, and any suitable arrangement of the steps may be utilizedwithout departing from the scope of the embodiments herein. Moreover,while procedures may be described separately, certain steps from eachprocedure may be incorporated into each other procedure, and theprocedures are not meant to be mutually exclusive.

In closing, an illustrative method according to one or more embodimentsof the present disclosure may comprise: receiving, at a receivingdevice, a communication from an initiating device on a communicationchannel, wherein the initiating device is configured to determinewhether an identity associated with the receiving device is verified bya verification service; verifying, by the receiving device, the identityassociated with the receiving device through a verification serviceclient application on the receiving device; conveying, from thereceiving device to the verification service over a verificationchannel, and in response to the identity associated with the receivingdevice being verified by the verification service client application,that the identity associated with the receiving device is verified,wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel, that the identity associated withthe receiving device is verified; and continuing, by the receivingdevice with the initiating device, the communication on thecommunication channel, wherein the initiating device is caused, inresponse to the identity associated with the receiving device beingverified, to manage the communication to the device according to theidentity being verified.

In one embodiment, the verification service client application hasverified the identity associated with the receiving device prior toreceiving the communication, and wherein the verification service clientapplication conveys that the identity associated with the receivingdevice is verified to the verification service over the verificationchannel upon receiving the communication on the communication channel.

In one embodiment, the communication is received prior to theverification service client application verifying the identityassociated with the receiving device, and wherein the verificationservice client application is caused to become activated during thecommunication to perform verification of the identity associated withthe receiving device. In one embodiment, the method further comprises:receiving an identity verification request from the receiving deviceover the verification channel during the communication; and invoking theverification service client application in response to the identityverification request to verify the identity associated with thereceiving device.

In one embodiment, the communication is received without theverification service client application on the receiving device, themethod further comprising: receiving a prompt from the initiating deviceover the verification channel during the communication to install theverification service client application; and installing the verificationservice client application in response to the prompt to then verify theidentity associated with the receiving device. In one embodiment, a timelimit is associated with the prompt to install the verification serviceclient application.

In one embodiment, verifying the identity associated with the receivingdevice through a verification service client application on thereceiving device comprises: receiving one or more authentication factorsinput at the receiving device, wherein conveying, to the verificationservice over the verification channel, that the identity associated withthe receiving device is verified, prevents access to the one or moreauthentication factors by at least the initiating device. In oneembodiment, conveying, to the verification service over the verificationchannel, that the identity associated with the receiving device isverified, further prevents access to the one or more authenticationfactors by the verification service.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: receiving, from theinitiating device via the verification service over the verificationchannel, an intention of the initiating device to initiate thecommunication to the receiving device prior to receiving thecommunication on the communication channel. In one embodiment, theintention comprises a particular time of initiating the communication.In one embodiment, the method further comprises: responding to theintention, via the verification channel, the responding requestinginitiating the communication at a particular time, wherein theinitiating device initiates the communication according to theparticular time.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: sending a prompt fromthe verification service client application, via the verificationchannel, to the initiating device to initiate the communication, whereinthe initiating device initiates the communication in response to theprompt. In one embodiment, the prompt is associated with a particulartime for the communication, and wherein the initiating device initiatesthe communication according to the particular time.

In one embodiment, verifying the identity associated with the receivingdevice through the verification service client application on thereceiving device comprises: receiving a response to one or moremulti-factor authentication (MFA) queries.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises, in response to thecommunication being managed by the initiating device according to theidentity being verified, one or more of: receiving secure informationover the communication; relaying transaction requests over thecommunication; and requesting modification of information associatedwith the verified identity.

In one embodiment, in response to the communication being managed by theinitiating device according to the identity being verified, theinitiating device is caused to receive one or more identity attributesassociated with the identity selected from a group consisting of: aname; an account number; an identification number; a verification level;a demographic; and a treatment level.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: conveying, from thereceiving device to the verification service over the verificationchannel, and in response to the identity associated with the receivingdevice being unverified by the verification service client application,that the identity associated with the receiving device is unverified,wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel, that the identity associated withthe receiving device is unverified; and continuing, by the receivingdevice with the initiating device, the communication on thecommunication channel, wherein the initiating device is caused, inresponse to the identity associated with the receiving device beingunverified, to manage the communication to the receiving deviceaccording to the identity being unverified. In one embodiment, inresponse to the communication being managed by the initiating deviceaccording to the identity being unverified, the initiating device iscaused to perform one or more actions selected from: preventing sharingsecure information over the communication; preventing transactionrequests received over the communication; preventing sharing ofinformation associated with the unverified identity; preventing requestsfor modification of information associated with the unverified identity;instructing against sharing secure information over the communication;instructing against performing transaction requests received over thecommunication; instructing against sharing of information associatedwith the unverified identity; instructing against modification ofinformation associated with the unverified identity; treating thecommunication with an unverified identity; and discontinuing thecommunication.

In one embodiment, the communication is selected from a group consistingof: a user-to-user communication; a user-to-enterprise communication;and an enterprise-to-user communication.

In one embodiment, the identity associated with the receiving device isverified in response to attestation of a user identity at the receivingdevice.

In one embodiment, the identity associated with the receiving device isverified without the initiating device accessing personally identifyinginformation (PII) associated with the identity.

In one embodiment, the communication is selected from a group consistingof: a voice communication; a video communication; a text communication;an email communication; and a data communication.

In one embodiment, verifying the identity associated with the receivingdevice is based on one or more authentication factors selected from agroup consisting of: facial recognition; fingerprint recognition; irisrecognition; device location information; social security number input;federal identification number input; password input; pin input; securityquestion input; and credit card code input.

In one embodiment, verifying the identity associated with the receivingdevice is based on one or more authentication factors input at thereceiving device, and wherein the initiating device has no access to theone or more authentication factors input at the receiving device.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: receiving a request forincreased assurance of verification of the identity from the initiatingdevice during the communication; verifying the identity associated withthe receiving device through the verification service client applicationon the receiving device according to the increased assurance ofverification request; conveying, from the receiving device, in responseto the increased assurance of verification, the increased assurance ofverification to the verification service over the verification channel,wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel, the increased assurance ofverification of the identity associated with the receiving device; andcontinuing, by the receiving device with the initiating device, thecommunication on the communication channel, wherein the initiatingdevice is caused to manage the communication to the receiving deviceaccording to whether an increased assurance is conveyed.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: receiving an identityverification level of the initiating device via the verificationchannel.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: sending an identityverification request from the receiving device to the initiating deviceduring the communication; and receiving a response to the identityverification request from the initiating device. In one embodiment,sending the identity verification request and receiving the response tothe identity verification request occurs via the verification channel.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: displaying averification level of the initiating device.

In one embodiment, the method further comprises: generating averification token in response to the identity associated with thereceiving device being verified; and wherein conveying that the identityassociated with the receiving device is verified comprises sending theverification token to the verification service, wherein the verificationservice is caused to convey the verification token to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel. In one embodiment, the initiatingdevice is configured to pass the verification token to a second deviceto cause the second device to determine that the identity associatedwith the receiving device is verified based on receiving theverification token. In one embodiment, the verification token isunexchangeable.

Also, an illustrative apparatus according to one or more embodiments ofthe present disclosure may comprise: one or more network interfaces tocommunicate on a communication channel; one or more network interfacesto communicate on a verification channel; a processor adapted to executeone or more processes; and a memory configured to store a processexecutable by the processor, the process when executed operable toperform a method comprising: receiving a communication from aninitiating device on the communication channel, wherein the initiatingdevice is configured to determine whether an identity associated withthe apparatus is verified by a verification service; verifying theidentity associated with the apparatus through a verification serviceclient application on the apparatus; conveying, to the verificationservice over a verification channel, and in response to the identityassociated with the apparatus being verified by the verification serviceclient application, that the identity associated with the apparatus isverified, wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to theinitiating device over the verification channel, that the identityassociated with the apparatus is verified; and continuing, with theinitiating device, the communication on the communication channel,wherein the initiating device is caused, in response to the identityassociated with the apparatus being verified, to manage thecommunication to the apparatus according to the identity being verified.

Furthermore, an illustrative tangible, non-transitory, computer-readablemedium according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosuremay store program instructions that cause a computer to execute aprocess comprising: receiving a communication from an initiating deviceon a communication channel, wherein the initiating device is configuredto determine whether an identity associated with the computer isverified by a verification service; verifying the identity associatedwith the computer through a verification service client application onthe computer; conveying, to the verification service over a verificationchannel, and in response to the identity associated with the computerbeing verified by the verification service client application, that theidentity associated with the computer is verified, wherein theverification service is caused to convey, to the initiating device overthe verification channel, that the identity associated with the computeris verified; and continuing, with the initiating device, thecommunication on the communication channel, wherein the initiatingdevice is caused, in response to the identity associated with thecomputer being verified, to manage the communication to the computeraccording to the identity being verified.

While there have been shown and described illustrative embodiments, itis to be understood that various other adaptations and modifications maybe made within the scope of the embodiments herein. For example, thoughthe disclosure was often described with respect to enterprise, or morespecifically, banking, examples, those skilled in the art shouldunderstand that this was done only for illustrative purpose and withoutlimitations, and the techniques herein may be used for any securecommunication environment between any two end-users/systems.Furthermore, while the embodiments may have been demonstrated withrespect to certain communication environments, physical environments, ordevice form factors, other configurations may be conceived by thoseskilled in the art that would remain within the contemplated subjectmatter of the description above. For example, various components andmodules may be distributed in manners not specifically described orillustrated herein, but that provide functionally similar results (e.g.,the timer which was described as part of the AVS Server may in fact beplaced, in one embodiment, in the AVS ACG, and so on). Also, while theterms “inbound” and “outbound” may have been used herein with regard toperspectives from the point of view of a call center/enterprise, thetechniques herein are not so limited, and may generally refer to“inbound” communication as communication received at a receiving device,and “outbound” communication as communication initiated by an initiatingdevice, each regardless of whether the initiating device or thereceiving device is the device that needs to have an associated identityverified by the respective other device.

Further, while certain authentication factors and/or verificationresponse inputs have been noted above, other factors/inputs may be usedin accordance with the techniques herein that are not specificallymentioned. Similarly, while certain actions have been listed with regardto managing a communication based on whether the entity to be verifiedis, in fact, verified or unverified, other managing actions may be takenwith the scope of the present disclosure, and those specificallymentioned are non-limiting examples.

In addition, while the techniques have been described above in terms ofone-to-one communication, the present disclosure may be applicable toone-to-many or many-to-one communications, such as conference calls, webconferences, and so on. For example, a presenter of a one-to-manyconference with a plurality of end users may wish to verify the identityof certain or all of the users, for security, attendance, or otherreasons. Example scenarios may include education, seminars, boardmeetings, shareholder meetings, business meetings, and so on.

The foregoing description has been directed to specific embodiments. Itwill be apparent, however, that other variations and modifications maybe made to the described embodiments, with the attainment of some or allof their advantages. For instance, it is expressly contemplated thatcertain components and/or elements described herein can be implementedas software being stored on a tangible (non-transitory)computer-readable medium (e.g., disks/CDs/RAM/EEPROM/etc.) havingprogram instructions executing on a computer, hardware, firmware, or acombination thereof. Accordingly this description is to be taken only byway of example and not to otherwise limit the scope of the embodimentsherein. Therefore, it is the object of the appended claims to cover allsuch variations and modifications as come within the true intent andscope of the embodiments herein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: receiving, at a receivingdevice, a communication from an initiating device on a communicationchannel, wherein the initiating device is configured to determinewhether an identity associated with the receiving device is verified bya verification service; verifying, by the receiving device, the identityassociated with the receiving device through a verification serviceclient application on the receiving device; conveying, from thereceiving device to the verification service over a verificationchannel, and in response to the identity associated with the receivingdevice being verified by the verification service client application,that the identity associated with the receiving device is verified,wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel, that the identity associated withthe receiving device is verified; and continuing, by the receivingdevice with the initiating device, the communication on thecommunication channel, wherein the initiating device is caused, inresponse to the identity associated with the receiving device beingverified, to manage the communication to the receiving device accordingto the identity being verified.
 2. The method as in claim 1, wherein theverification service client application has verified the identityassociated with the receiving device prior to receiving thecommunication, and wherein the verification service client applicationconveys that the identity associated with the receiving device isverified to the verification service over the verification channel uponreceiving the communication on the communication channel.
 3. The methodas in claim 1, wherein the communication is received prior to theverification service client application verifying the identityassociated with the receiving device, and wherein the verificationservice client application is caused to become activated during thecommunication to perform verification of the identity associated withthe receiving device.
 4. The method as in claim 3, further comprising:receiving an identity verification request from the receiving deviceover the verification channel during the communication; and invoking theverification service client application in response to the identityverification request to verify the identity associated with thereceiving device.
 5. The method as in claim 1, wherein the communicationis received without the verification service client application on thereceiving device, the method further comprising: receiving a prompt fromthe initiating device over the verification channel during thecommunication to install the verification service client application;and installing the verification service client application in responseto the prompt to then verify the identity associated with the receivingdevice.
 6. The method as in claim 5, wherein a time limit is associatedwith the prompt to install the verification service client application.7. The method as in claim 1, wherein verifying the identity associatedwith the receiving device through a verification service clientapplication on the receiving device comprises: receiving one or moreauthentication factors input at the receiving device, wherein conveying,to the verification service over the verification channel, that theidentity associated with the receiving device is verified, preventsaccess to the one or more authentication factors by at least theinitiating device.
 8. The method as in claim 7, wherein conveying, tothe verification service over the verification channel, that theidentity associated with the receiving device is verified, furtherprevents access to the one or more authentication factors by theverification service.
 9. The method as in claim 1, further comprising:receiving, from the initiating device via the verification service overthe verification channel, an intention of the initiating device toinitiate the communication to the receiving device prior to receivingthe communication on the communication channel.
 10. The method as inclaim 9, wherein the intention comprises a particular time of initiatingthe communication.
 11. The method as in claim 9, further comprising:responding to the intention, via the verification channel, theresponding requesting initiating the communication at a particular time,wherein the initiating device initiates the communication according tothe particular time.
 12. The method as in claim 1, further comprising:sending a prompt from the verification service client application, viathe verification channel, to the initiating device to initiate thecommunication, wherein the initiating device initiates the communicationin response to the prompt.
 13. The method as in claim 12, wherein theprompt is associated with a particular time for the communication, andwherein the initiating device initiates the communication according tothe particular time.
 14. The method as in claim 1, wherein verifying theidentity associated with the receiving device through the verificationservice client application on the receiving device comprises: receivinga response to one or more multi-factor authentication (MFA) queries. 15.The method as in claim 1, further comprising, in response to thecommunication being managed by the initiating device according to theidentity being verified, one or more of: receiving secure informationover the communication; relaying transaction requests over thecommunication; and requesting modification of information associatedwith the verified identity.
 16. The method as in claim 1, wherein, inresponse to the communication being managed by the initiating deviceaccording to the identity being verified, the initiating device iscaused to receive one or more identity attributes associated with theidentity selected from a group consisting of: a name; an account number;an identification number, a verification level; a demographic; and atreatment level.
 17. The method as in claim 1, further comprising:conveying, from the receiving device to the verification service overthe verification channel, and in response to the identity associatedwith the receiving device being unverified by the verification serviceclient application, that the identity associated with the receivingdevice is unverified, wherein the verification service is caused toconvey, to the initiating device over the verification channel, that theidentity associated with the receiving device is unverified; andcontinuing, by the receiving device with the initiating device, thecommunication on the communication channel, wherein the initiatingdevice is caused, in response to the identity associated with thereceiving device being unverified, to manage the communication to thereceiving device according to the identity being unverified.
 18. Themethod as in claim 17, wherein, in response to the communication beingmanaged by the initiating device according to the identity beingunverified, the initiating device is caused to perform one or moreactions selected from: preventing sharing secure information over thecommunication; preventing transaction requests received over thecommunication; preventing sharing of information associated with theunverified identity; preventing requests for modification of informationassociated with the unverified identity; instructing against sharingsecure information over the communication; instructing againstperforming transaction requests received over the communication;instructing against sharing of information associated with theunverified identity; instructing against modification of informationassociated with the unverified identity; treating the communication withan unverified identity; and discontinuing the communication.
 19. Themethod as in claim 1, wherein the communication is selected from a groupconsisting of: a user-to-user communication; a user-to-enterprisecommunication; and an enterprise-to-user communication.
 20. The methodas in claim 1, wherein the identity associated with the receiving deviceis verified in response to attestation of a user identity at thereceiving device.
 21. The method as in claim 1, wherein the identityassociated with the receiving device is verified without the initiatingdevice accessing personally identifying information (PII) associatedwith the identity.
 22. The method as in claim 1, wherein thecommunication is selected from a group consisting of: a voicecommunication; a video communication; a text communication; an emailcommunication; and a data communication.
 23. The method as in claim 1,wherein verifying the identity associated with the receiving device isbased on one or more authentication factors selected from a groupconsisting of: facial recognition; fingerprint recognition; irisrecognition; device location information; social security number input;federal identification number input; password input; pin input; securityquestion input; and credit card code input.
 24. The method as in claim1, wherein verifying the identity associated with the receiving deviceis based on one or more authentication factors input at the receivingdevice, and wherein the initiating device has no access to the one ormore authentication factors input at the receiving device.
 25. Themethod as in claim 1, further comprising: receiving a request forincreased assurance of verification of the identity from the initiatingdevice during the communication; verifying the identity associated withthe receiving device through the verification service client applicationon the receiving device according to the increased assurance ofverification request; conveying, from the receiving device, in responseto the increased assurance of verification, the increased assurance ofverification to the verification service over the verification channel,wherein the verification service is caused to convey, to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel, the increased assurance ofverification of the identity associated with the receiving device; andcontinuing, by the receiving device with the initiating device, thecommunication on the communication channel, wherein the initiatingdevice is caused to manage the communication to the receiving deviceaccording to whether an increased assurance is conveyed.
 26. The methodas in claim 1, further comprising: receiving an identity verificationlevel of the initiating device via the verification channel.
 27. Themethod as in claim 1, further comprising: sending an identityverification request from the receiving device to the initiating deviceduring the communication; and receiving a response to the identityverification request from the initiating device.
 28. The method as inclaim 27, wherein sending the identity verification request andreceiving the response to the identity verification request occurs viathe verification channel.
 29. The method as in claim 1, furthercomprising: displaying a verification level of the initiating device.30. The method as in claim 1, further comprising: generating averification token in response to the identity associated with thereceiving device being verified; and wherein conveying that the identityassociated with the receiving device is verified comprises sending theverification token to the verification service, wherein the verificationservice is caused to convey the verification token to the initiatingdevice over the verification channel.
 31. The method as in claim 30,wherein the initiating device is configured to pass the verificationtoken to a second device to cause the second device to determine thatthe identity associated with the receiving device is verified based onreceiving the verification token.
 32. The method as in claim 30, whereinthe verification token is unexchangeable.
 33. An apparatus, comprising:one or more network interfaces to communicate on a communicationchannel; one or more network interfaces to communicate on a verificationchannel; a processor adapted to execute one or more processes; and amemory configured to store a process executable by the processor, theprocess when executed operable to perform a method comprising: receivinga communication from an initiating device on the communication channel,wherein the initiating device is configured to determine whether anidentity associated with the apparatus is verified by a verificationservice; verifying the identity associated with the apparatus through averification service client application on the apparatus; conveying, tothe verification service over a verification channel, and in response tothe identity associated with the apparatus being verified by theverification service client application, that the identity associatedwith the apparatus is verified, wherein the verification service iscaused to convey, to the initiating device over the verificationchannel, that the identity associated with the apparatus is verified;and continuing, with the initiating device, the communication on thecommunication channel, wherein the initiating device is caused, inresponse to the identity associated with the apparatus being verified,to manage the communication to the apparatus according to the identitybeing verified.
 34. A tangible, non-transitory, computer-readable mediumstoring program instructions that cause a computer to execute a processcomprising: receiving a communication from an initiating device on acommunication channel, wherein the initiating device is configured todetermine whether an identity associated with the computer is verifiedby a verification service; verifying the identity associated with thecomputer through a verification service client application on thecomputer; conveying, to the verification service over a verificationchannel, and in response to the identity associated with the computerbeing verified by the verification service client application, that theidentity associated with the computer is verified, wherein theverification service is caused to convey, to the initiating device overthe verification channel, that the identity associated with the computeris verified; and continuing, with the initiating device, thecommunication on the communication channel, wherein the initiatingdevice is caused, in response to the identity associated with thecomputer being verified, to manage the communication to the computeraccording to the identity being verified.